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1. Editorial 
 
The 2008 edition of the Kuhmo-Nectar Summer School and Conference on Transport 
and Urban Economics, which was held at the VU University in Amsterdam on July 3 
and 4, 2008, was the third in a sequence that started in Finland in 2006, followed by a 
second edition in Urbino in 2007. As in the previous editions, the conference was tied to 
a summer school earlier in the same week. Various themes were identified for the 
summer school and conference. The latter eventually attracted nearly 60 papers, 
covering many aspects of transport economics, but with a clear focus on transport 
modelling, transport pricing, and capacity investments, often analyzed from the 
economic perspective.2 This special issue reflects the diversity of themes addressed at 
the conference, within the thematic boundaries implied by the orientation on transport 
and urban economics. 
The special issue begins with a contribution from Andrew Koh and Simon Shepherd. 
This paper was elected for the Award for the Best Paper by a Young Scholar. It studies 
the modelling of pricing by competing profit-maximizing road operators in a network, 
and develops heuristic algorithms for finding the corresponding equilibria, considering 
both Nash equilibria and collusion. An intuitive result is that when the degree of 
collusion goes from ‘none’ to ‘full’, the solution goes from ‘Nash’ to ‘monopoly’. Still, 
the paper confirms that in some cases, notably when considering pricing of serial links, 
collusion may be preferable to Nash competition because the latter leads to a multiple 
application of revenue-maximizing mark-ups. 
                                                 
1
 The conference organizers would like to thank DVS Centre for Transport and Navigation, Transumo, 
VU University, Tinbergen Institute, and Nectar for vital support. 
2
 The Conference attracted over 60 attendants while the Summer School attracted some 35 students and 
had 9 instructors: Ken Small, Richard Arnott, Andre de Palma, Nathalie Picard, Mogens Fosgerau, Alex 
Anas, Piet Rietveld, Jan Brueckner, and Erik Verhoef. 
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The second paper by Michiel Bliemer and Dirk van Amelsfort is also concerned with 
price incentives in road transport, but studies ‘positive’ incentives – user subsidies for 
avoiding peak travel, rather than a peak charge to discourage it. The research was 
carried out in the context of a Dutch project ‘Spitsmijden’ (‘Avoiding the Peak’) in 
which such incentives are actually tested in practice. This paper investigates the 
possible impacts of such a measure when evaluated from a full dynamic network 
perspective. The results show that the impacts of rewarding depend rather strongly on 
both the level of the reward and the number of participants. This provides an important 
insight for the design of future projects along these lines. 
The next contribution is by Salvatore Amoroso, Marco Migliore, Mario Catalano, and 
Fabio Galatioto. They study urban transport policies for bus systems in small and 
medium towns. Specifically, they are interested in the design of bus networks, and 
propose a multi-actor objective function for evaluation that combines the interests of 
operators and travellers. Applying this objective in a model for the Sicilian city of 
Trapani, they develop an optimisation routine that succeeds in producing a more 
efficient bus network, characterized by higher frequencies, more origin-destination pairs 
served, and shorter travel times, at the expense of having more transfers by passengers 
between different lines. 
Mark Koetse and Jan Rouwendal, in the fourth paper, focus on inter-urban freight 
transport. Specifically, they assess the welfare impacts of a Dutch dedicated freight 
railway connecting the harbour of Rotterdam and the German Ruhr Area, and do this in 
the context of the dynamic / strategic cost-benefit analysis tool, the Molino model 
(developed by A. de Palma and S. Proost). Although freight transport demand through 
The Netherlands will increase, and the new connection is predicted to carry substantial 
freight flows and to support the competitive position of Rotterdam, an overall welfare 
loss from the project results when costs of investments and operations are taken into 
account. This confirms the need to perform solid ex ante cost benefit analyses for large 
infrastructure projects. 
The fifth and final paper, by Guillaume Pouyanne, addresses the interrelationships 
between mobility, urban form, and socio-demographic characteristics. The paper 
proposes an econometric method, the “typological regressions”, to deal with the mutual 
causalities and interdependencies. Applying the method for the city of Bordeaux, the 
author succeeds in corroborating some hypotheses on such interrelationships that were 
formulated in the earlier literature, for instance on the relation between urban density 
and transport demand. 
As it addresses both road transport and public transport, both passenger and freight 
transport, and also the interactions between transport and land-use, we believe this 
special issue offers a fair representative sample of the main topics discussed during the 
Amsterdam meeting. 
Since this meeting, another successful edition has already taken place in Copenhagen 
(2009), and another one is currently in preparation for Valencia (2010). We of course 
hope to publish some of the results of these meetings in future editions European 
Transport \ Trasporti Europei. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 3-22 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tolling, collusion and equilibrium problems with 
equilibrium constraints 
 
Andrew Koh 1∗, Simon Shepherd 1 
 
1
 Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An Equilibrium Problem with an Equilibrium Constraint (EPEC) is a mathematical construct that can 
be applied to private competition in highway networks. In this paper we consider the problem of finding a 
Nash Equilibrium in a situation of competition in toll pricing on a network utilising two alternative 
algorithms. In the first algorithm, we utilise a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based on the cutting 
constraint algorithm for toll pricing. The second algorithm that we propose, a novel contribution of this 
paper, is the extension of an existing sequential linear complementarity programming approach for 
finding the competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium constraint. Finally we 
develop an intuitive approach to represent collusion between players and demonstrate that as the level of 
collusion goes from none to full collusion so the solution maps from the Nash to monopolistic solution. 
However we also show that there may be local solutions for the collusive monopoly which lie closer to 
the second best welfare toll solution than does the competitive Nash equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming (SLCP); EPEC; Competition; Nash 
Equilibrium; Collusion. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The motivation of the research in this paper stems from the observation that in recent 
years there has been increasing amount of private sector participation within areas that 
are conventionally the privy of the public purse. The driving force behind this change is 
the assumed higher efficiency of the private sector coupled with increasing public 
pressures on governments for accountability and the corresponding need to derive value 
for money from their various budgetary commitments which are ultimately funded by 
the tax paying public. 
In highway transportation, privately operated roads are not novel concepts (Viton, 
1995). However there has been little analysis on this topic in terms of the competition 
between private sector providers and the equilibrium outcomes, save for theoretical 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Andrew Koh (a.koh@its.leeds.ac.uk) 
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studies often restricted to networks with two parallel links (e.g. Verhoef et al, 1996; de 
Palma and Lindsey, 2000). In reality, there have already been examples of private sector 
involvement in road construction and operation around the world (Fisher and Babbar, 
1996; Roth, 1996)1. In return for the private capitalists funding large amounts of initial 
capital investments for the construction of the road, they are contractually allowed to 
collect tolls, for some agreed duration from users when the road is finally opened (Engel 
et al, 2002). In an era when government budgets are becoming increasingly tight and 
with traffic congestion becoming more of a problem in many major cities, the private 
sector is recognised as having an increasing role to play in the provision of traditional 
highway transportation investment. When the private sector is tasked with the provision 
of such services and in competition with others simultaneously doing the same, the 
concept of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) can be used to model the equilibrium 
decision variables offered to the market.  
In this paper we consider the problem of toll optimisation in modelling the situation of 
private sector participation in the operation of transportation services. In the case of toll 
only competition, we provide two heuristics for the solution of the problem. The first is 
simply a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based on the cutting constraint algorithm for 
toll pricing which builds on our previous work (Koh et al, 2009). The second algorithm 
that we propose, a novel contribution of this paper is an extension of the existing 
Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Approach (SLCP) for finding the 
competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium constraint. 
Although SLCP has previously been formulated for a general Nash game (Kolstad and 
Mathiesen, 1991), we believe this to be the first application of the approach to an EPEC 
problem where the toll operators compete at the upper level but are bound by the lower 
level equilibrium of the user response in terms of demand and route choice. This 
application of SLCP to an EPEC should be useful in other fields such as the electricity 
market. We present various examples from the same network to illustrate the 
performance of these heuristics and compare the competitive solutions with both 
monopolistic and second best welfare maximising regimes. These examples include 
both parallel and serial links in competition. Finally, we consider how to model 
collusive behaviour between operators and propose an intuitive structure which allows 
this response to be modelled. With this natural structure we show that when moving 
from no collusion through partial collusion to full collusion a path is drawn between the 
Nash and monopoly solutions. Where an un-priced substitute link is present local 
optima may exist which we suggest may be more likely than a true global solution 
which has interesting implications for policy-makers and the behaviour of toll operators. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we define the problem 
considered along with the concept of Nash Equilibrium from Nash (1950) which serves 
as the foundation of non-cooperative games that we discuss. Section 3 then outlines two 
heuristic algorithms for the problem. Section 4 utilises numerical examples to illustrate 
the performance of the algorithms. In Section 5 we relax the notion of non-cooperative 
behaviour and consider if it is possible for the players to signal, through their selection 
of strategic variables, to their competitor, their intention to collude such that they end up 
in a monopolistic equilibrium. Finally in Section 6, we summarise our results and 
provide directions for further research. 
                                                 
1
 There are in fact real world examples of such competition, in Australia, private operators compete with 
public operators for toll revenues on the Sydney Orbital Motorway Network. See 
http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/usingroads/motorwaysandtolling/index.html, accessed July 2009. 
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2. Problem Context 
 
Our problem is to find an optimal equilibrium toll for each private operator2 who 
separately controls a predefined link on the traffic network under consideration. We can 
consider this problem to be a Cournot-Nash game between these individual operators. 
The equilibrium decision variables can be determined using the concept of Nash 
equilibrium (Nash, 1950) which we define as follows: 
 
2.1. Nash Equilibrium 
 
In a single shot normal form game with N players indexed by i,j∈{1,2,...,N}, each 
player can play a strategy ui∈Ui which all players are assumed to announce 
simultaneously. Let u=(u1,u2,…,uN)∈U be the combined strategy space of all players in 
this game and let ψi(u) be some payoff or profit function to player i∈{1,2,...,N} if the 
combined strategy is played. The combined strategy tuple is a Nash Equilibrium 
u
*
=(u*1,u*2,…,u*N)∈U for the game if the following holds 
 
* * *( , ) ( , ) , , {1,2,... },i i j i i j i iu u u u u U i j N i jψ ψ≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ≠  (1) 
 
Equation (1) states that a Nash equilibrium is attained when no player in the game has 
an incentive to deviate from his current strategy. She is therefore doing the best she can 
given what her competitors are doing (Pyndyck and Rubinfeld, 1992). 
 
2.2. Problem Definition 
 
We now outline the problem we wish to solve as viewed by each operator with 
equilibrium conditions imposed on the users’ route choice. 
 
Define: 
A: the set of directed links in a traffic network, 
B: the set of links which have their tolls, B A⊂  
K: the set of origin destination (O-D) pairs in the network 
v : the vector of link flows [ ],av a A= ∈v   
τ : the vector of link tolls [ ],a a Bτ= ∈τ  
c(v) : the vector of monotonically non decreasing travel costs as a function of link 
flows on that link only 
[ ( )],a ac v a A= ∈c  
µ : the vector of generalized travel cost for each OD pair [ ],k k Kµ= ∈µ  
d : the continuous and monotonically decreasing demand function for each O-D pair 
as a function of the generalized travel cost between OD pair k alone, [ ],kd k K= ∈d  and 
−1D : the inverse demand function 
Ω : feasible region of flow vectors, defined by a linear equation system of flow 
conservation constraints. 
                                                 
2
 As the research transcends both game theory and market structures in the context of highway 
transportation, we will use the terms “private operators” and “players” interchangeably throughout.  
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If we assume that each player is able to control3 only a single ith link in the network 
then, following Yang et al (2009), the optimisation problem for each ith player, which 
represents the maximisation of the profit for the operator,4 is formulated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ,Max
i
i i iv i N
τ
ψ τ= ∀ ∈τ τ  (2) 
 
Where vi is obtained by solving the variational inequality (see Smith, 1979;  
Dafermos, 1980) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , 0  for ,T T−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v τ v v D d τ d d v d Ω  (3) 
 
The objective for each firm (payoff) is the toll revenue obtained by charging tolls on 
the link operated by the ith player. 
 
Note that the vector of link flows can only be obtained by solving the variational 
inequality given by (3). This variational inequality represents Wardrop’s user 
equilibrium condition which states that no road user on the network can unilaterally 
benefit by changing routes at the equilibrium (Wardrop, 1952). Throughout this paper, 
we make the additional simplifying (yet not uncommon) assumption that the travel cost 
of any link in the network is dependent only on flow on the link itself so that the above 
variational inequality in (3) can be solved by means of a convex optimisation problem 
(Beckmann et al, 1956). 
 
 
3. Two Heuristic Algorithms for EPECs 
 
The problem we have defined in the previous section is in fact an Equilibrium 
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) (Mordukhovich, 2005, 2006; Su 2005). 
In essence the EPEC’s are problems of finding equilibrium points of players when they 
are bound by constraints specifying an overall system equilibrium. The study of EPECs 
has only recently surfaced as an important research area within the field of mathematics 
but has significant practical applications e.g. in deregulated electricity markets (Ralph 
and Smeers, 2006). 
In this paper, we propose two alternative heuristics for the resolution of the problem. 
The first algorithm is the diagonalisation algorithm which is a modified version of the 
non-linear Gauss-Seidel method (as discussed in e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970); 
Judd, 1998). The second algorithm is a novel heuristic derived from reformulating the 
standard Nash game from economics as a complementarity problem and solving it using 
a Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming approach (SLCP). The extension is 
to apply this SLCP approach within the EPEC setting as described earlier.  
                                                 
3
 Control is used as a short hand to imply that the firm has been awarded some franchise for operating the 
link. 
4
 Here we have assumed no costs of toll operation for ease of presentation, however these can be 
introduced quite easily. 
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3.1. Diagonalization Algorithm (Algorithm 1) 
 
One of the first algorithms introduced for this problem was that of decomposing the 
problem into a series of interrelated optimisation problems and subsequently solving 
each individually. This is also known as a fixed point iteration algorithm which has also 
been referred to as the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm. In economics, Harker (1984) 
popularised this algorithm for solving a Cournot-Nash game. In a similar fashion, 
Cardell et al (1997) and Hobbs et al (2000) have used the diagonalisation algorithm to 
solve EPECs arising in the deregulated electricity markets. 
 
The algorithm is presented as follows: 
 
Diagonalisation Algorithm 
Step 0: Set iteration counter k=0. Select a convergence tolerance 
parameter, ε(ε>0). Choose a strategy for each player. Let the 
initial strategy set be denoted 
1 2
( , ,..., )
N
k k k k
u u u u= . Set k=k+1 and go 
to Step 1. 
Step 1: For the ith player i∈{1,2,...,N}, solve the following optimization 
problem: 
1 max ( , ) , {1, 2,... },
i i
k k
i i i j
u U
u u u i j N i jψ+
∈
= ∀ ∈ ≠  
Step 2: 
If 1
1
N
k k
i i
i
u u ε+
=
− ≤∑  terminate, else set 1k k= +  and return to Step 1. 
 
In step 1, we utilise the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and 
Hearn, 2004) to solve the optimisation problem for each player holding the other 
player’s strategic variables fixed. Further details regarding the CCA are provided in the 
appendix to this paper.  
The convergence proof of the diagonalisation algorithm when applied to single level 
Nash equilibrium problems can be found in Pang and Chan (1982) or Dafermos (1983). 
However the proof depends on certain conditions that may not be satisfied in an EPEC, 
particularly the concavity of the payoff functions. In fact, convergence of the algorithm 
relies on the concept of diagonal dominance of the Jacobians of the payoff functions 
(Gabay and Moulin, 1980, Theorem 4.1 p. 280), which intuitively requires that a player 
has more control over his own payoff than do his competitor(s). Therefore we propose 
this algorithm to be a heuristic approach for the EPEC at hand. 
 
3.2. Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Algorithm (Algorithm 2) 
 
Since the game between the operators in this paper is akin to a Nash game, the second 
algorithm reformulates the Nash game as a complementarity problem. Adopting this 
approach, Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991) developed a Sequential Linear 
Complementarity Programming (SLCP) approach to solve the resulting reformulation. 
The extension below is to re-formulate this within the EPEC framework whereby the 
Nash game is played out at the upper level between the toll operators while the user 
equilibrium conditions are respected at the lower level – hence and equilibrium problem 
with equilibrium constraints. At each iteration, the main problem is linearised (using a 
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first order Taylor expansion) at a given starting point. Then the sub problem is solved as 
a linear complementarity problem for which the algorithm of Lemke (1965) can be 
applied. As far as we are aware, this is the first application of the algorithm to the EPEC 
and should be useful in other fields.  
To demonstrate the approach, recall that the profit of the firm i  is given by (2). The 
first order conditions of a profit maximum for each firm are therefore given by (4)-(6) 
as follows: 
 
0ii
i
f ψ
τ
∂
= − ≥
∂
 (4) 
0i i
i
ψ
τ
τ
∂
=
∂
 (5) 
0iτ ≥  (6) 
 
These first order conditions define a complementarity problem (CP) as characterized 
by the system (7) which is to: 
Find Nτ +∈ℜ given : N Nf R R+ →  such that 
 
( ) 0
( ) 0
0
T τ
≥
=
≥
f τ
τ f
τ
 (7) 
 
If we linearise f  at 0τ (some arbitrary starting vector of tolls) using the first order 
Taylor expansion, then we obtain 0 0 0 0( / ) ( ) ( )( )Lf f fτ τ τ τ τ τ= + ∇ − . Hence, following 
(Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1991), the resulting Linear Complementarity Program (LCP) is 
to find jτ +∈ ℜ  such that 
 
0( / ) 0,
( ) 0,
0
T
Lf q M
q M
τ τ τ
τ τ
τ
= + ≥
+ =
≥
 (8) 
 
Where 0 0 0( ) ( )q f fτ τ τ= − ∇  and 0( )M f τ= ∇ . 
 
In summary the proposed algorithm is as follows: 
 
Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming Algorithm 
Step 0: Choose some starting vector of tolls τ0. Select a convergence 
tolerance parameter, ε(ε>0), and set k=k+1 and go to Step 1. 
Step 1: Solve the traffic assignment problem (3) with τk. 
Step 2: Employ finite differencing to approximate f(τk) and ( )kf τ∇  
Step 3: Solve the LCP (8) to obtain τk+1 
Step 4: Check convergence: If max 1( )kf τ ε+ < , terminate else set k=k+1 
and go to Step 1. 
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Note that in order to solve the LCP5, we require both the Jacobian of the profit 
function f(τk) for each firm in the game at iteration k and the Hessian (M). To do so, we 
solve a traffic assignment problem at kτ and perturb the tolls by using the method of 
central differences (i.e. via a combination of forward and backward differencing) to 
approximate the gradients. The underlying assumption here is that the derivatives exist 
and can be approximated in this way6.  
As with the diagonalisation approach, the convergence proof of this algorithm relies 
specifically on the concavity of the payoff functions of each firm (Kolstad and 
Mathiesen, 1991, Theorem 1, p 741). While this assumption is usually acceptable in 
modelling the classical Nash game for which it was developed, it may not be satisfied in 
a general EPEC setting.  
 
 
4. Numerical Examples 
 
In this section, we provide examples of how the proposed heuristics are used to solve 
for the optimal tolls. In addition, we compare the equilibrium outputs under the 
scenarios of competition, monopoly and under the policy of (second best) social welfare 
maximisation. 
In the case of monopoly, we assume there is a single private operator controlling the 
predefined links in the network. Hence this is a simpler problem that can be solved 
directly using the CCA (see the Appendix) or any derivative free direct search method 
(e.g. Hooke Jeeves direct search (Hooke and Jeeves, 1961) or Nelder Mead Simplex 
algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965)). For the results presented here, the CCA was 
utilised. 
Similarly in the case of social welfare maximisation by levying toll charges only, the 
central planner solves the following problem. 
 
( )
1
0
Max ( ) ( )
. .
,
0
kd
a a a
k K a A
d x c v v
s t
τ
τ τ
−
∈ ∈
−
∈ Ω
≤ ≤
∑ ∑∫
v d
 (9) 
 
Where τ is the pre-specified upper bound on tolls on tolled links, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈ . The 
CCA algorithm can be utilised for this problem as in Koh et al (2009). 
 
The example used is taken from Koh et al (2009). The link specific parameters and 
the elastic demand functions can be found therein. This network has 18 one way links 
with 6 origin destination pairs (1 to 5, 1 to 7, 5 to 1, 5 to 7, 7 to 1 and 7 to 5).  
                                                 
5
 In terms of implementation, to solve the SLCP in Step 2, we used the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 
2000) within MATLAB. 
6
 We have made use of finite differencing to obtain first and second order derivatives despite there being 
alternative methods based on sensitivity analysis (Yang and Huang, 2005) proposed for obtaining these 
derivatives. We apply finite differences as this is simple to apply and is often used in the estimation of 
gradients in much numerical work. 
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Two parallel link scenarios are considered in this numerical example. In Scenario 1, 
Links 3 and 4 in Figure 1 are the only links in this network that are subject to tolls. In 
Scenario 2, Links 7 and 10 are the only links subject to tolls in the network. Note that in 
all which follows we set the maximum allowable toll to be 5000 seconds. The bound of 
5000 was chosen as this translates into a practical toll level of approximately £6 which 
is considered to be reasonable maximum on the basis of acceptability for a toll on one 
link. As we demonstrate later this upper bound will only apply to one link in the 
monopolistic case. We also look at serial link scenarios with Scenario 3 tolling links 3 
and 7 where there is an element of route choice for the users to avoid both links and 
Scenario 4 tolling links 1 and 3 where there is no route choice to avoid the toll on link 1. 
 
1
2
3
6 11 7
94
5
14
13
17
16
18
15
8
10 12
1 2 5
3
4
76
 
Figure 1: Network for Example 1. 
Source: Koh et al (2009). 
Table 1: Comparing Solution by Alternative Algorithms for competitive tolls. 
 Diagonalisation7 SLCP8 
 Link Toll 
(secs) 
Iterations CPU Time 
(secs) 
Toll 
(secs) 
Iterations CPU Time 
(secs) 
Scenario 1 
 
3 
4 
530.63 
505.65 
25 
 
1213.7 
 
530.55 
505.62 
6 
 
9.8 
 
Scenario 2 
 
7 
10 
141.37 
138.29 
25 
 
1200.8 
 
141.36 
138.29 
6 
 
9.5 
 
Scenario 3 
 
3 
7 
248.62 
   97.84 
23 
 
1211.2 
 
248.65 
   98.52 
5 
 
8.3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
1 
3 
    5000 
   35.20 
19 
 
  914.9 
 
    5000 
   35.20 
5 
 
8.8 
 
 
Table 1 shows the resulting tolls, number of iterations and CPU9. times required for 
each algorithm to converge to the Nash solution. As shown the resulting tolls are almost 
identical and any differences are due to the convergence criteria used. The proposed 
SLCP algorithm uses fewer iterations and is much faster than the diagonalisation based 
approach – requiring less than 1% of the CPU time. 
                                                 
7
 Using the diagonalisation algorithm with CCA (Algorithm 1) and a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06 
8
 Using the SLCP algorithm (Algorithm 2) with a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06. 
9
 CPU time refers to the time taken by the central processing unit of the computer to perform the 
evaluation using of the respective algorithms to the precision tolerances specified. 
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Table 2 shows the tolls, the revenues collected and the change in social welfare for 
each toll pair under (a) the competitive case, (b) the monopoly case and (c) the second-
best welfare case where operators are assumed to co-operate to maximise social welfare. 
Firstly, the table shows that when there are no alternative routes available (as in the case 
of Scenario 1 where Links 3 and 4 are tolled), the monopolist can charge the maximum 
toll allowable for link 3. In fact the upper bound of the toll here is a binding constraint 
on the toll in the monopoly case. The toll on link 4 is lower due to the slightly longer 
free-flow travel time. A check with both tolls set at 5000 seconds showed that the total 
revenue was indeed lower than shown in table 2 (being only 3,555,289 seconds). As 
may be expected with the monopolistic case the impact on welfare is negative. However 
in the case of two competing operators, each player has no alternative but to succumb to 
the strategy charged by the other and hence ultimately both are only able to charge a 
much lower toll (around 10% of the monopolist’s toll). The overall welfare change for 
Scenario 1 under competition is reasonably close to that of second best social welfare 
maximisation, but is as expected lower. 
Table 2: Tolls, Revenues and Social Welfare under Alternative Market Structure Assumptions (Tolls in 
seconds, Revenue and Welfare Change in seconds per hour). 
  
Competition: Revenue 
Maximisation 
Monopoly: Revenue 
Maximisation 
Second Best Welfare 
Maximisation 
 Link Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue Welfare 
Change 
Scenario 1 3 530.63 461,882 87,633 500010 2,543,530 -1,581,256 510.93 449,583 87,818 
Parallel 4 505.65 420,293  4986.73 1,013,577  488.13 407,301  
Total Revenue   882,175   3,557,108   856,883  
           
Scenario 2 7 141.37 105,295 187,422 713.19 280,255 150,587 181.83 116,209 202,311 
Parallel 10 138.29 100,848  709.53 266,465  179.30 110,580  
Total Revenue   206,143   546,720   226,783  
           
Scenario 3 3 248.65 146,756 -88,020 242.01 147,209 -76,956 0 0 95,795 
Serial 7 98.52 54,309  92.54 54,275  141.89 74,027  
Total Revenue   201,065   201,482   74,027  
           
Scenario 4 1 5000 3,552,057 -1,590,050 5000 3,553,670 -1,585,945 488.21 836,935 87,818 
Serial 3 35.20 11,122  26.73 10,513  22.74 20,008  
Total Revenue   3,563,179   3,564,184   856,943  
 
The more interesting case emerges in Scenario 2 when there is an un-tolled alternative 
(Link 17 in Figure 1) available for travel into destination Zone 5. In this situation, even 
a monopolist controlling both Links 7 and 10 together cannot charge the maximum 
allowed toll of 5000 seconds on each link to maximise his revenue. Here the tolls are 
                                                 
10
 As the original network parameters included an elasticity of -0.58 for this case (with constant elasticity 
demand function) a true unbounded toll would tend to infinity. To create a reasonable unbounded solution 
with an interior solution we would have to increase the elasticity of demand. A test with elasticity of -2.0 
was conducted and this gave an interior solution with tolls of 751 and 728 seconds which are well within 
the bound of 5000 seconds. 
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limited to around 700 seconds (though the impact on welfare is positive). In the case of 
competition, Table 2 shows that the tolls charged and the total revenue earned are even 
lower than under that of a central planner attempting to maximise social welfare. So we 
may conclude that where there is an un-tolled alternative, competition has the effect of 
driving tolls down below the socially optimal toll level which was not the case for 
scenario 1 where there was no un-tolled alternative. The change in social welfare is still 
as expected lower under competition. 
Furthermore, the tolls are lower under competition than under monopoly. Since 
parallel links are the equivalent of substitutes in the route choice, this supports the 
general observation by Economides and Salop (1992) that competition between 
substitute products would lead to lower prices (vis-à-vis monopoly). 
The first two scenarios have focused on parallel competing links. In the case of serial 
links, economic theory suggests that the tolls would be higher under competition than 
under a single monopoly (Economides and Salop, 1992; Small and Verhoef, 2007). 
Under scenarios 3 and 4 where we have serial links in competition we verify this result 
that the tolls are indeed higher under the competitive solution than under the single 
monopoly and hence result in a greater loss in welfare. It is also worth noting that where 
there are alternative free routes as in scenario 3 then the tolls are relatively low even 
under monopoly, whereas under scenario 4 where the toll on link 1 has no free 
substitute route, then the upper bound constrains the solution and the operator of link 1 
exerts power over the operator of link 3. In these serial cases, both the competitive and 
monopolistic solution results in a negative welfare change compared to the second best 
welfare maximising tolls implying that with competition, society is worse off which has 
crucial implications for policy makers. They should consider carefully whether to allow 
direct competition in the serial link case. 
 
 
5. Possibilities for Collusion between Operators 
 
This section of the paper investigates collusion and considers whether it is possible 
for operators to receive signals from a competitor to achieve the revenues associated 
with monopoly control over their networks. In this section of the paper, our examples 
are restricted to games with two players. To this effect, we introduce a scalar, α  
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) which represents the degree of co-operation between the players when they 
optimise their toll revenues for links under their control.  
With α, we can consider a more general form of the expression for the payoff 
function (2) as given in (10) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ), , ,i i i j jv v i j N i jψ τ α τ= + ∀ ∈ ≠τ,β τ,β τ,β  (10) 
 
Equation (10) reduces to the familiar form of (2) when α = 0; and when α = 1 the 
objective of each player is to maximise the total toll revenue of both players. Note that 
she can only however change tolls on links under her control and continues to take the 
other player’s toll as exogenous. Thus whilst the thi  player is in the process of 
optimising her revenue, she is taking into account a proportion represented by α  of 
the thj  player’s toll revenue. In doing so via the diagonalisation algorithm, she is 
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effectively “signalling” to her competitor that she wishes to “collude” to maximise total 
revenue. It is implicitly assumed that players reciprocate the actions of their competitors 
and would do likewise. Thus the α term represents some intuitive level of collusion 
between players, ranging from no collusion, through partial collusion to full collusion.  
Consider the network shown in Figure 1 and recall the two separate scenarios 
developed therein with Scenario 1 being toll revenue competition on links 3 and links 4 
while Scenario 2 represented toll revenue competition on links 7 and links 10. 
 
5.1. Collusion in Scenario 1  
 
Figure 2 shows, for the case depicted in Scenario 1, how the toll solution moves from 
the non-cooperative Nash Solution when (α = 0) towards the monopoly solution (α = 1) 
as the level of collusion is increased. In particular, when α = 1, we obtain exactly the 
same solution as the monopoly operator’s tolls as shown in Table 2. 
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Figure 2: Scenario 1: Tolls set by each operator as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
It can also be observed that with slightly “less than full collusion” (α= 0.95 or 0.99) 
the toll levels are also much lower thereby suggesting that less than full collusion can 
lead to substantial losses (in revenues) for both players. Figure 3 shows the revenues for 
operators of links 3 and 4 and the total revenue as the collusion parameter is varied. 
Notice that when going from a collusion level of 0.99 to 1.0 the upper bound on the toll 
becomes active which means that to generate more total revenue the operator of link 4 
must accept a reduction in revenue. This is due to the higher free flow travel time on 
link 4 and the interaction with the upper bound on tolls on link 3. Obviously this upper 
bound is theoretic here but in practical applications, there could be some upper bound 
set as part of some franchise agreement with a regulator. If this were the case then it 
would not be in the interests of the second operator to collude unless there was some 
contract to share out the resulting revenues. We therefore suggest that under such cases 
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there may be a limited collusion aspect which would bring down the tolls compared to 
the true monopolistic solution. 
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Figure 3: Scenario 1: Revenues as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
5.2. Collusion in Scenario 2 
 
In the case of Scenario 2, where there is an additional route (Link 17) that is not 
subject to tolls, this form of implicit collusion however does not obtain the solution 
under monopoly. In particular, consider the situation when α=1, then employing the 
diagonalisation algorithm, the equilibrium tolls obtained are as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Tolls and Revenues for Scenario 2 considering collusion with α=1. 
Link Toll (seconds) Revenues (seconds) 
Link 7 189.76 116,816 
Link 10 186.58 111,216 
Total Revenues  227,402 
 
Figure 4 illustrates however that the above solution is in fact a local optimum of the 
total revenue function. The results reported in Table 3 are plotted together in Figure 3 
where it is compared against the global optimum which is in fact the solution obtained 
under monopoly (see Table 2). 
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Figure 4: Total Revenue Surface as Tolls on Link 7 and 10 vary. 
 
This illustrates the general difficulty with optimisation algorithms and the potential 
for a local equilibrium to be located. There is also a possibility that in Scenario 2, there 
continues to be a link (number 17 in Figure 1) available that is in competition with the 
tolled links and hence even under collusion, there could exist an incentive to capture 
that untolled traffic by reducing the toll charge and breaking the collusion which may 
result in an alternative local solution rather than a global one. In Koh (2008), we 
presented a global optimisation algorithm to locate this global optimum based on 
particle swarm optimisation (PSO). However it is not clear whether the behaviour of the 
operators would allow them to find the global optimum in this case. PSO is based on 
some learning scheme – but to learn how such a surface operates requires an element of 
trust in your competitor. It is our view that the diagonalisation approach better 
reproduces realistic behaviour of operators and tests with other initial toll levels or 
starting points all result in the local rather than global solution. This suggests that the 
local monopoly solution may be the more likely of the two outcomes which has 
significant implications for both policy-makers and operators as here the tolls are lower 
and closer to second best welfare maximisation. 
To reinforce this claim we show in Figure 5 that as the collusion parameter is 
increased then the tolls on links 7 and 10 do in fact move from the Nash tolls to this 
local monopolistic toll set. This time, as the tolls remain within bounds, the move 
towards the monopoly solution is smooth and the revenues increase for both operators 
as α is increased. 
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Figure 5: Scenario 2: Tolls as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
5.3. Collusion in Scenario 3 
 
For the serial links 3 and 7 the benefits of collusion are small as the users have the 
opportunity to avoid the second toll and so there is little common traffic between the 
links. The tolls move smoothly between the competitive solution and the monopoly 
solution reported in table 2. 
In passing it is worth mentioning that serial links 7 and 12 or 10 and 11 result in the 
same optimal tolls for the competitive and monopolistic cases. This is because the links 
have no common traffic and can be considered as independent so there is no possibility 
of monopoly here. This shows that at the extreme the serial link result is that the 
competitive tolls are greater than or equal to the monopoly tolls. 
 
5.4. Collusion in Scenario 4 
 
In this case, as the collusion parameter (α) varies, the toll on Link 1 remains constant 
at 5000 seconds (the upper bound). However, the toll for Link 3 decreases smoothly 
towards the monopolistic toll as shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 also shows the revenue for 
link 3 which decreases as the level of collusion increases. This is the same effect as was 
seen for scenario 1 as the stronger operator is bound by the upper limit on the toll. In 
order to generate more revenue in total the weaker operator must accept a lower 
revenue, so there is no incentive to collude here without a revenue sharing agreement. 
Thus we can say for both the serial and parallel case where one operator becomes 
limited by some upper bound on the toll level then there will be no incentive to collude 
for the second operator. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 3-22 
 17 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
To
lls
 
(se
c
o
n
ds
)
10200
10300
10400
10500
10600
10700
10800
10900
11000
11100
11200
Re
v
e
n
u
e
 
(se
c
o
n
ds
)
Toll on Link 3 (seconds) revenue link 3
Collusion parameter (α)
 
Figure 6: Scenario 4: Toll and revenue on link 3 as collusion parameter (α) varies. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The first element of this paper demonstrated the use of two heuristics to solve the toll 
competition problem which is basically an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium 
Constraints or EPEC. The first was simply a Gauss Seidel fixed point approach based 
on the cutting constraint algorithm for toll pricing which builds on our previous work 
(Koh et al, 2009). The second algorithm which is a novel contribution of this paper is 
the extension of an existing Sequential Linear Complementarity Programming approach 
for finding the competitive Nash equilibrium when there is a lower level equilibrium 
constraint. Although SLCP has previously been formulated for a general Nash game 
(Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1991), we believe this to be the first application to an EPEC 
problem where the toll operators compete at the upper level but are bound by the lower 
level equilibrium of the user response in terms of demand and route choice. This 
application of SLCP to an EPEC was shown to give the same solution as the 
diagonalisation approach but with significantly lower computation time. (We believe 
this approach could prove useful also in other fields such as analysing deregulated 
electricity markets.) 
The second element of the paper compared the competitive, monopolistic and second 
best welfare maximising solutions for both parallel and serial link toll operation. These 
tests confirmed that in the parallel link case competitive tolls are lower than monopoly 
tolls and are reasonably close to second best welfare tolls. In the serial link case we also 
confirmed that the competitive tolls were greater than (or equal to) the monopoly tolls 
and that the welfare level is lower under competition than under monopoly. This would 
suggest that regulators should not allow direct competition in the serial link case. 
However for both the serial and parallel cases it was also shown that the presence of un-
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tolled alternatives reduces the toll levels and so reduces opportunities for monopolistic 
behaviour. 
The third element of the paper introduced an intuitive formulation of collusive 
behaviour. To this effect, we introduced a collusion parameter to reflect the degree of 
cooperation between operators. Implicit in the assumption was that operators would be 
willing to reciprocate the action of the other and we have ignored the associated issues 
of stability of coalitions formed. Nevertheless, even for the simple examples presented 
in this paper, we have found the potential for multiple equilibria to be obtained. 
Furthermore we demonstrated that in all cases as collusion increases from none through 
to full collusion then the tolls map from the Nash solution to the monopoly solution in a 
smooth manner. Where a local monopoly solution exists then the collusive behaviour 
can also map toward this local monopoly rather than the global one which is by 
definition more acceptable to the public in terms of welfare change. 
 However for both the serial and parallel cases where the first operator is limited by an 
upper bound on the toll level then to increase total revenue the second operator must 
accept a reduction in revenue. Thus there is no incentive to collude in this case unless 
there is some form of agreement to share revenues set up in advance. 
There is much scope to develop this work further considering the case of asymmetric 
collusion where one operator colludes more than the other which takes us into the area 
of leader-follower games such as Stackelberg. In terms of algorithms there is the 
obvious extension to the case of more than two operators which raises the question of 
whether the heuristics will converge with more complex tolling systems. In addition, the 
analysis presented in this paper can be employed to study competition between cities 
intending to introduce road pricing and/or other demand management or capacity 
enhancement measures. These serve as topics for further research which could build on 
the findings presented here. 
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Appendix 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) 
 
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
 
In the case of a single operator (operator is a used here generically) who sets tolls 
and/or capacities to optimise some objective function which could be to maximise social 
welfare in the case of a local authority or to maximise profit in the case of a private 
firm. This optimisation problem is effectively a Mathematical Program with Equilirium 
Constraints (MPEC). The economic paradigm for a generic MPEC is based on the 
setting of a Stackleberg game where the leader sets his strategic decision variables and 
the road users on the network follow. In optimising his objective the decision maker has 
to take into account the responses of the road users whose route choice is given by 
Wardrop’s Equilibrium Condition. A large amount of development has occurred in this 
branch of mathematical optimisation (Luo et al 1996) which has applications in e.g. 
mechanics, robotics and transportation analysis. The primary difficulty with the MPEC 
is that they fail to satisfy certain technical conditions (known as constraint 
qualifications) at any feasible point (Chen and Florian, 1995; Scheel and Scholtes, 
1995). In recent research, Koh et al (2009) investigated the use of the cutting constraint 
algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004) to solve an MPEC in the context 
of second best congestion pricing and capacity optimisation. 
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Reinterpretation of Variational Inequality Condition  
 
Let us define the 2 additional variables 
 
aβ : a pre-specified upper bound on capacities, [ ],a a Bβ β= ∈  
τ : a pre-specified upper bound on tolls, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈  
 
As we have defined in the main paper, the feasible region of flow vectors, Ω, is a 
linear equation system of flow conservation constraints. 
From convex set theory, e.g. (Bazaraa et al 2008, Theorem 2.1.6 p.43), (v,d) ∈Ω can 
be defined as a convex combination of a set of extreme points. Hence we can rewrite the 
equilibrium condition (3) using the following: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , , , 0  for T Te e e Eτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v u v D d q d  
 
Where (uε,qε) is the vector of extreme link flow and demand flow indexed by the 
superscript e, and E is the set of all extreme points of Ω. 
 
A Cutting Constraint Algorithm for the MPEC 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm redefines the variational inequality using the 
extreme points. Together with the initial extreme point, generated by an initial shortest 
path problem, and the constraints defining feasible flows, the master problem is solved 
to find the optimal tolls and capacities at each iteration. Subsequently new extreme 
points (“cuts”) are found by solving a sub problem using the results for the current 
iteration. 
 
The CCA Algorithm is as follows:  
 
CCA Algorithm 
Step 0: Initialise the problem by finding the shortest paths for each O-D 
pair; set l (iteration counter) = 0; define the aggregated link flow and 
demand flow (ul,ql); and include (ul,ql) into E. 
Step 1: Set l=l+1. Solve the Master Problem with all extreme points in E 
and obtain the solution vector (v,d,τ,β); then set (vl,dl,τl,βl). 
Step 2: Solve the Sub Problem with (vl,dl,τl,βl) and obtain the new extreme 
point (ul,ql). 
Step 3: Convergence Check:  
If ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1, , , , 0TTl l l l l l l l l lτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥c v u v D d q d , terminate and 
(vl,dl,τl,βl) is the solution, otherwise include (ul,ql) into E and return 
to Step 1. 
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The Master Problem in Step 1 is defined as follows:  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The sub problem of Step 2 is a shortest path problem which is formulated as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
min , , , ,
. .
,
TT
s t
τ β τ β−⋅ − ⋅
∈ Ω
u q
c v u D d q
u q
 
 
 
Further details of our implementation of the algorithm can be found in Koh et al 
(2009). Our numerical experiments indicate that for a small network tested in that paper, 
CCA obtained the global solution in a large number of test instances (as verified against 
a multi-start derivative free Hooke Jeeves (Hooke and Jeeves, 1961) method. Instances 
where it failed could be resolved by modifying the variable bounds which is recognised 
as a common obstacle in applying gradient based non linear programming methods to 
solve MPECs. 
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Abstract 
 
Instead of giving a negative incentive such as transport pricing, a positive incentive by rewarding 
travelers for ‘good behavior’ may yield different responses. In a Dutch pilot project called Peak 
Avoidance (in Dutch: “SpitsMijden”), a few hundred travelers participated in an experiment in which 
they received 3 to 7 euros per day when they avoided traveling by car during the morning rush hours 
(7h30–9h30). Mainly departure time shifts were observed, together with moderate mode shifts. Due to the 
low number of participants in the experiment, no impact on traffic conditions could be expected. In order 
to assess the potential of such a rewarding scheme on traffic conditions, a dynamic traffic assignment 
model has been developed to forecast network wide effects in the long term by assuming higher 
participation levels. This paper describes the mathematical model. Furthermore, the Peak Avoidance 
project is taken as a case study and different rewarding strategies with varying participation levels and 
reward levels are analyzed. First results show that indeed overall traffic conditions can be improved by 
giving a reward, where low to moderate reward levels and participation levels of 50% or lower are 
sufficient for a significant improvement. Higher participation and reward levels seem to become 
increasingly counter-effective. 
 
Keywords: Pricing policies; Rewarding; Traffic conditions; Peak avoidance. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, increasing congestion levels, environmental pollution, and other external 
costs are experienced in most countries. Road pricing is seen as one of the most 
effective measures to battle these externalities. Road pricing does not need much 
introduction and for the interested reader we refer to Verhoef et al. (2008). An 
increasing number of countries has introduced some form of pricing, from simple local 
toll roads (e.g., Scandinavia, France), cordon charges (e.g., London, Singapore, 
Stockholm), and dynamic pricing (San Diego), to nation-wide kilometer charging 
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(Germany). The main principle is to let the user pay the costs for the ‘damage’ he or she 
causes, such as congestion costs, road maintenance costs, and pollution costs. In 
economic terms, pricing aims to internalize the external costs.  
 
1.1. Charging versus rewarding 
 
Charging, however, is a negative incentive and travelers’ public acceptability of such 
a measure is typically low. Giving positive incentives is likely to have little resistance, 
while similar results may be expected. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
indicates that losses and gains are valued differently, and therefore also the magnitude 
of the responses between charging and rewarding is expected to be different. In this 
paper, we focus on rewarding instead of charging, by looking at a positive incentive for 
travelers when they show ‘good behavior’. Furthermore, mainly the travelers’ responses 
to a rewarding scheme and their impact on traffic conditions will be investigated.  
Both charging and rewarding, also called push and pull measures, may be used to 
achieve the same objective, although in many perspectives they are different. In terms 
of acceptability, rewarding will be seen as more acceptable by most people than 
charging. With respect to effectiveness, it is not quite clear if charging is more effective 
than rewarding. Prospect theory would argue that losses have a more emotional impact 
than an equivalent amount of gains, such that charging should be considered as more 
effective. However, Schuitema et al. (2003) argue that some car drivers consider 
rewarding more effective, since punishment is bad for effectiveness and a positive 
incentive makes people happy, which contributes to its effectiveness. On the other 
hands, the effectiveness may be less with rewarding than with charging because of the 
induced demand that is higher with rewarding than under (optimal) tolling. From an 
economical point of view, charging (e.g., in the form of a tax) yields revenues, which 
has generally an indirect positive welfare effect, while for rewards such effects turn into 
a disadvantage. 
The effects of rewarding on travel behavior has been tested by other researchers, and 
Nielsen and Sørensen (2008) for example find that providing rewards (as a proxy for 
testing road pricing schemes) does lead to travelers seeking other alternatives. Also, the 
levels of the rewards have an effect on the size of behavioral responses as well. The 
main behavioral responses found were new routes and for “occasional” trips new 
destinations, time of day (to non-peak) and to some extent, fewer trips. 
Although interesting and also important, a description of a true business case is 
beyond the scope of this paper. In other words, it is assumed that the money for paying 
the rewards is available, and potential traffic effects of the rewarding scheme are 
analyzed, while not worrying about the source of the money. One can imagine that a 
Department of Transport could be interested in financing such a reward in order to 
alleviate congestion when road construction work yields significant additional 
congestion. Recently, the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water 
Management has introduced two of such rewarding projects during construction works 
at two main motorway bridges. 
 
1.2. Dutch Peak Avoidance project 
 
In October to December 2006, a Dutch experiment called Peak Avoidance 
(“SpitsMijden” in Dutch) was conducted as a real life pilot study on the Dutch road 
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network. In this experiment, 340 regular car driving commuters from the city of 
Zoetermeer to The Hague participated voluntarily. The A12 motorway is the main 
connection between these two cities and is heavily congested. The average trip distance 
is approximately 15 km and the trip takes between 10 minutes (free-flow) and 30 
minutes (during congestion). During ten weeks, each participant was offered a reward if 
he or she avoided traveling by car during the morning rush hours (7h30–9h30). The 
reward was either monetary (systematically varied between 3 and 7 euros per peak 
avoidance), or one could save for a free smartphone and navigation system. In this 
paper, we focus on the effects of the monetary reward, however more information on 
the smartphone reward and their impacts can be found in Knockaert et al. (2007) and 
Ettema et al. (2008). Also, more general information of the project and many results can 
be found there. Car trips of participants were detected using transponder detectors and 
cameras with license plate recognition. Figure 1 illustrates the area and the location of 
the detection points. If a traveler is not detected on a working day, then the reward is 
given, relative to the average number of passages the participant made per week before 
the start of the pilot (license plate recognition was already in place for recruitment of the 
participants). Travelers could look at their gained rewards on a website. Additional 
questions about their trip were asked each day. 
 
The Hague
Zoetermeer
A12
detector
camera
 
Figure 1: Zoetermeer – The Hague network with A12 motorway and detection points. 
 
Since the detection points basically cover all routes from Zoetermeer to The Hague 
(and were known to the participants), route changes by the participants are not much 
expected. Mainly departure time shifts are expected, avoiding the morning peak by 
traveling earlier than 7h30 or later then 9h30. Also, shifts to other modes of transport 
can be expected. Some behavioral responses to the rewarding scheme are presented in 
Figure 2. First of all, the situation before and after rewarding is more or less the same 
(with some slight differences in public transport and bike use, which can be explained 
by cold weather conditions at the end of the pilot period). Hence, without rewards, there 
is no incentive to make any changes. With a reward of 3 euros per day, a significantly 
lower number of people travel during the morning peak (25% compared to 50%), and 
with a reward level of 7 euros this even decreases to 19%. Participants have a clear 
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preference for departing earlier (before 7h30) than later (after 9h30). Also, public 
transport use increases under the reward scheme, from approximately 4% to 10%.1 Note 
that the difference in effects between a reward of 3 and 7 euros is actually not that large. 
Already with a reward level of 3 euros, many participants decided not to travel by car 
during the morning rush hours. For more details, see Knockaert et al. (2007) and Ettema 
et al. (2008). 
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Car after 9:30
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Figure 2: Behavioral responses to rewarding for avoiding the morning peak. 
 
1.3. Aim of the model study 
 
The behavioral changes observed in the pilot study are very interesting and offer 
insights into the sensitivities of travelers to a reward, at least in the short term. Long 
term effects on the traffic conditions could not be investigated due to the low number of 
participants in and the short run of the experiment. In order to assess such a rewarding 
scheme in terms of congestion levels and overall network performance, a mathematical 
transportation model is proposed in this paper, taking into account decisions of trip 
makers, such as trip choice, mode choice, departure time choice, and route choice. 
Higher numbers of participants can be simulated in the model. Since we are mainly 
interested in long term effects, feedback loops exist in the model such that travelers may 
change their decisions based on their experience. For example, if the rewarding scheme 
pushes participants away from the morning peak, the peak hours may become less 
congested, attracting other (non-participants) travelers possibly towards the peak period. 
All these interactions are included in the model. 
 
1.4. Paper outline 
 
In the next section, the model framework and methodology will be described, and 
each model component will be discussed in more detail. Then in the following section 
the Peak Avoidance rewarding scheme will serve as input for the model and different 
reward strategies will be analyzed using the proposed model. Results on total network 
travel time savings for different reward strategies will be presented, along with some 
                                                 
1
 During the pilot, the public transport was not operating at intended levels of service due to technical 
problems, which may bias the mode choice results in the pilot. 
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other results. Finally, the last section concludes with a discussion and directions for 
further research. 
 
 
2. Model framework and methodology 
 
In this section, the methodology and models used in the remainder of the paper will 
be described. The described model is able to determine responses to general pricing 
measures (which can be location and time specific) and takes trip and mode choice 
changes, departure time changes, and route changes into account. The latter two are 
modeled in more detail than the first two. Instead of talking about ‘pricing’, we use 
‘rewarding’, which is mathematically a negative price inside the model framework 
(although the parameters may be different). The model is multiclass in the sense that it 
can deal with different preferences for different groups of travelers. In our case study 
later, this will mainly be used to describe participants (user-class 1) and non-participants 
(user-class 2) of the (voluntary) rewarding scheme. Different vehicles classes (e.g., cars 
and trucks) will not be considered in this paper, although this would be a direction for 
future research. For a more detailed description of the model and the parameter 
estimates, we would like to refer to Van Amelsfort (2009). 
 
2.1. Overall framework of the model 
 
The model consists of different components, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the 
modeling sequence the (static) total car demand is distributed over user groups, 
departure time intervals, and the available routes based on network conditions. To 
reflect trip and mode choice changes, the level of demand also changes as a result of 
changes in generalized costs. Thus, the aggregation level as well as the demand level 
itself change within the model and in order to discuss properly we first define three 
different types of demand. 
 
- The first type of demand we define rsD as the total demand for car travel in a 
reference situation without rewards. In this case the demand is not user class 
specific;  
- The second we define  ( )
rs
mD k  as the initialized dynamic demand. The demand is 
user class specific, it is dynamic, and it includes the primary effect of rewards on 
demand (given that traffic conditions have not yet changed); 
- The third type ( )rsmD k  constitutes the resulting dynamic travel demand after 
applying demand elasticity factors and departure time shifts. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the model process starts with an initialization model in which 
the total car demand is split up between the participants and non-participants, demand is 
distributed over different time periods according to preferred departure times, and initial 
elastic demand effects of introducing the reward are applied. This initialization model 
results in the initialized dynamic demand and is the starting point for the iterative 
equilibrium process. This iterative process starts with calculating new levels of demand 
based on changes in traffic conditions and costs. These demand changes result from 
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simultaneous calculations of elastic demand effects and departure time choice 
adjustments. The new demand levels are input for new route choice calculations after 
which the new traffic conditions can be determined using a traffic simulation model. We 
will now discuss the details of each of these components in the model.  
 
generalized 
costs
( )rs
mpf k
( )rs
m
D k
elastic demand model
departure time choice model
route choice model
traffic simulation model
( )rs
mpc k
tolls /
rewards
( )a tτ
travel
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( )a tθ
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elasticities me
network ( , )G N A=
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PAT profiles ( )m lpi
rsDtotal travel demand(non) participation rates mρ
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m
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Figure 3: Overall framework of the model. 
 
2.2. Initialization model 
 
In the initialization model, the first step is to split up the total car demand into two 
user classes (participants and non-participants), according to rs rs
m m
D Dρ=  using 
participation rates ρm, where m represents user-classes 1 and 2. These participations 
rates are exogenous input into the model. Then the static user class specific demand is 
distributed over the different departure time periods k, using (calibrated) preferred 
arrival time (PAT) profiles πm(l) for each arrival period l. The profiles for the two 
different classes need not be the same, as participation of the rewarding scheme is 
voluntary and it is more likely that travelers that already travel very early or very late in 
the morning peak will participate. The dynamic initial travel demand, indicating the 
number of cars departing at time k, is determined as follows: 
 
,0( ) ( ) ,rs rs rsm m mD k k Dpi τ= +  (1) 
 
in which τrs,0 is the (minimum) free-flow travel time between r and s. In other words, 
the free-flow travel times are used to convert the preferred arrival time, l, to a preferred 
departure time, k, where l = k + τrs,0. We thus assume that travelers initially depart 
according to their preferred time of travel, not taking congestion into account. The 
former two steps together determine a first user class specific dynamic demand. Using 
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this first dynamic demand we can run the route choice and traffic simulation model for 
the first time to get time dependent generalized costs. Let ,0rsmc  and 
rs
mc  denote the flow-
weighted (over routes and departure times) average generalized costs before and after 
the rewarding scheme, respectively (hence only primary effects are considered at this 
stage, as the travel demand is considered fixed; secondary responses will be dealt with 
in the elastic demand model). Then the initialized dynamic demand per user-class may 
be determined by 
 
,0
ˆ ( ) ( ),rs rs rs
m m m
D k M D k=
 
(2) 
 
with 
 
,0
,0 ,
mers
rs m
m rs
m
cM
c
 
=  
 
 
(3) 
 
where em ≤ 0 is an elasticity factor indicating the sensitivity of travelers to costs. 
The elastic demand effects (factors) ,0rsmM  are applied to the first dynamic demand 
( )rs
m
D k  to arrive at ˆ ( )rsmD k  the initialized dynamic demand which enters the iterative 
process. The initialization model is completed by a final route choice and traffic 
simulation model. The resulting route travel times and travel costs are then input to the 
elastic demand model and departure time choice model in the next steps. 
 
2.3. Elastic demand model (trip choice and mode choice) 
 
Trip choice is the decision of travelers to make a trip or not. Pricing or rewarding may 
lead to a change in the number of trips, e.g. an individual may decide to work from 
home or not. It may also lead to changes in transportation mode, as car travel becomes 
more (in)expensive and travelers may decide to divert to public transport. Both trip 
choice and mode choice lead to changes in the car travel demand. 
Denote the generalized costs for each user-class m, departure time k, and route p from 
origin r to destination s, described by the total costs of travel time and monetary costs, 
by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ),rs T rs C rsmp m p m mpc k k kβ τ β θ= −  (4) 
 
where ( )rsp kτ  is the corresponding route travel time, and ( )
rs
mp kθ  is the reward 
received by user-class 1 (and is zero for user-class 2, the non-participants). Furthermore, 
T
mβ  and 
C
mβ  are behavioral parameters to be estimated. 
In the elastic demand model, the secondary responses of travelers are taken into 
account, which include departure time choice and route choice. Let rsmc  now denote the 
current flow-weighted (over routes and departure times) generalized travel costs for OD 
pair (r,s). The elastic demand effects, which are again multiplication factors denoted by 
rs
mM , are now determined by comparing the generalized costs from the reference 
alternative (in the same iteration) which the current generalized costs similar as in 
Equation (3). These factors are applied to the new dynamic demand that results from 
departure time choice mode.  
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2.4. Departure time choice model 
 
The dynamic initial travel demand, derived in Equation (1), assumes that free-flow 
conditions hold. In practice, free-flow conditions typically do not hold as congestion 
occurs. Travelers may adjust their departure time from their preferred departure time to 
another departure time in order to avoid congestion or to gain a reward. Let ( )rsmc k  
denote the flow-weighted (over routes) average generalized travel costs. Then the utility 
of a traveler of class m of choosing departure time k, while the traveler prefers arrival 
time l, will be defined as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,0 ,0( | ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ).
rs rs DE rs DL rs
m m m m
AE rs AL rs rs
m m m
U k l c k l k k l
l k k k k l k
β τ β τ
β τ β τ ε
+ +
+ +
= − + − − + − + +
− − + + − +
 (5) 
 
where (x)+ ≡ max {0,x}. 
Besides the average generalized costs, capturing travel time (including congestion) 
and possible rewards, this utility includes an early and late departure schedule delay, 
and an early and late arrival schedule delay, respectively. For a detailed discussion on 
these schedule delays, see Small (1982) and Van Amelsfort and Bliemer (2006). Since l 
- τrs,0 is the preferred departure time, l - τrs,0 - k indicates an early (if positive) or late 
(if negative) departure. Similarly, since k + τrs(k) is the actual arrival time when 
departing at time k, then l - k - τrs(k) indicates an early (if positive) or late (if negative) 
arrival, where τrs(k) is the flow-weighted (over routes) average OD travel time. The 
parameters DEmβ , 
DL
mβ , 
AE
mβ , and 
AL
mβ  are behavioral parameters to be estimated. The 
unobserved random terms ( )rsm kε  denote all other factors not included in the utility 
function that may have an impact on departure time choice. Denote the observed part of 
the utility by ( | )rsmV k l . If all terms ( )rsm kε  are independently and identically extreme 
value type I distributed, the probability of choosing departure time k, given the 
preference for arrival time l, is given by the following multinomial logit model 
(McFadden, 1974): 
 
( ) ( )( )
exp ( | )( | ) Pr ( | ) ( | ), .
exp ( | )
rs
mrs rs rs
m m m rs
mk
V k l
k l U k l U k l k
V k l
ϕ
′
′ ′= ≤ ∀ =
′∑
 (6) 
 
For each traveler with a certain preferred arrival time l there is such a probability 
distribution over departure times. In order to determine the new travel demand ( )rs
m
D k , 
all travelers departing at the same time interval have to be aggregated, independent on 
what their preferred arrival time is: 
 
,0( ) ( | ) ( ).rs rs rs rs rsm m m m
l
D k k l M D lϕ τ= −∑  (7) 
 
2.5. Route choice model 
 
The route choice model consists of a route generation component and a route choice 
component. In the route generation the most likely routes are determined using a 
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stochastic route selection procedure, described in Bliemer and Taale (2006). This 
procedure is able to generate a route set that includes all relevant routes (where 
irrelevant routes are for example routes with long detours) and filter out largely 
overlapping routes. Let rsmP denote the generated route set for origin-destination pair 
(r,s) for user-class m. Given this route choice set, travelers decide which route to 
choose, based on the utility of each route that comprises the generalized travel costs, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ),rs rs rsmp mp mpU k c k kε= − +  (8) 
 
where ( )rsmp kε  are an unobserved random terms, assumed independently and 
identically extreme value type I distributed, such that for each departure time k, the 
route choice proportions can be computed as 
 
( )
( )
exp ( )( ) Pr( ( ) ( ), ) .
exp ( )
rs
mprs rs rs
mp mp mp rs
mpp
c k
k U k U k p
c k
ψ
′
′′
−
′= ≤ ∀ =
−∑
 (9) 
 
Clearly, more advanced route choice models could have been used in which 
correlations between route alternatives are taken into account, such as the path-size logit 
(PSL) model or the paired combinatorial logit (PCL) model. However, the above simple 
multinomial logit model is at least robust (see Bliemer and Bovy, 2008) and largely 
overlapping route alternatives are mostly filtered out in the route generation process. 
Given these proportions, the route flows can be determined as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ).rs rs rsmp mp mf k k D kψ=  (10) 
 
2.6. Traffic simulation model 
 
Given the route flows ( )rsmpf k , many different kinds of traffic simulation models can 
be used, either microscopic simulators (e.g., PARAMICS, VISSIM, AIMSUN2, etc.) or 
macroscopic models (VISUM, INDY, MADAM, etc.). In this paper we use the dynamic 
network loading procedure in the INDY model which runs in the OmniTRANS 
environment, as it is easy to add scripts in OmniTRANS to include elastic demand and 
departure time choice, and because it is a fast model (given the fact that the traffic 
simulation procedure will be called many times in an iterative procedure, computation 
time is an issue). INDY combines the above described route choice model and traffic 
simulation model, and is extended with the elastic demand and departure time choice 
models. For the interested reader, more information about INDY can be found in 
Bliemer et al. (2004) and Bliemer (2007). 
 
 
3. Case study: Peak Avoidance rewarding scheme 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Peak Avoidance project is a local initiative, 
investigating what the potential effects of rewarding travelers for good behavior are, in 
this case rewarding for not traveling during the morning rush hours (7h30–9h30). 
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Behavioral responses have been measured as indicated in the introduction, but impacts 
on traffic conditions could not be measured due to the low number of participants. In a 
model study we are able to increase this number of participants, even to 100%, and try 
to forecast what the network effects will be.  
First, we will describe the input for the model, being (i) a description of the network 
and travel demand, (ii) behavioral parameters, and (iii) reward strategies. Then, some 
modeling results will be presented, which include (i) departure profiles, indicating how 
travelers change their departure time on aggregate, (ii) travel time savings, and (iii) 
reward payments, indicating how much the authority will pay when applying such a 
reward system.  
 
3.1. Description of the model input 
 
Transportation network and travel demand 
 
Rotterdam
Gouda
Zoetermeer
The Hague
Leiden
 
Figure 4: Transportation network and zones. 
 
The transportation network is given as a connected graph with 1,133 nodes and 
approximately 3,500 directed links, see Figure 4. For each link, the length, maximum 
speed, number of lanes, capacity, and speed at capacity are known. In the model we do 
not take delays at intersections into account, data on signalized intersections is not used. 
In total there are 168 zones that serve as an origin and/or destination, indicated in Figure 
4. The total (initial) travel demand is 473,868 car trips in the morning time period 6h00-
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11h00, of which 40,722 originate from Zoetermeer, 8,475 have a destination in The 
Hague. This latter number is also the maximum number of Peak Avoidance participants.  
 
Behavioral parameters 
 
In order to determine the parameters of the participants and non-participants, stated 
choice experiments were conducted, in which respondents had to choose their preferred 
travel option from hypothetical choice situations, in which the travel times, departure 
times, rewards or tolls were varied systematically. For non-participants, the parameters 
are obtained a stated choice experiment described in Van Amelsfort (2009), and for 
participants from an experiment described in Knockaert et al. (2007). Table 1 lists the 
used parameter values. The departure schedule delay parameters are not significant for 
participants, indicating that they are flexible in departure time. Compared to non-
participants, they also have lower values for arrival schedule delays, also indicating 
more flexibility with respect to arrival times. This seems a plausible finding, as 
participation is voluntary. 
Table 1: Behavioral model parameters. 
Parameter Non-participants Participants 
T
mβ  -0.0247 -0.0220 
C
mβ   0.2490 
DE
mβ  -0.0791 * 
DL
mβ  -0.0162 * 
AE
mβ  -0.0292 -0.0147 
AL
mβ  -0.0339 -0.0137 
m
e  -0.2 -0.25 
Note: * Not specified in the model. 
 
Furthermore, PAT profiles for non-participants (at 0% participation) are calibrated 
from comparison between the network model output with several (dynamic) traffic 
counts and travel time measurements from loop detectors. For participants, the PAT 
profile was obtained from a pilot survey. Figure 5 shows the PAT profiles for both user-
classes. For both participants and non-participants, most travelers seem to prefer to 
arrive around 8h30. The PAT profile for participants is much more concentrated around 
8h30 than for non-participants, although some participants also prefer to arrive after 
10h00. It is logical that the participants PAT profile is more concentrated around 8h30, 
as only travelers frequently traveling between 7h30 and 9h30 were asked to volunteer. 
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Figure 5: PAT profiles for (non) participants. 
 
3.2. Reward strategies 
 
Since in the real life pilot study only a few hundred travelers participated in the 
rewarding scheme, no changes in traffic conditions were expected. By changing the 
participation level in the model we are able to make a forecast about potential impacts 
on the traffic conditions (on a network level). Participation levels are chosen as 10% 
(848 travelers), 50% (4,238 travelers), and 100% (8,475 travelers). These strategies are 
compared considering a rewarding scheme of 5 euros per day when not traveling during 
the morning peak from Zoetermeer to The Hague. The reference strategies consider a 
reward of 0 euro, describing the current situation. Note that three different reference 
strategies are needed for making the comparisons, as participants and non-participants 
have different behavioral parameters and PAT distributions. Ideally, we would like to 
have an endogenous participation level, dependent on the reward level and the PAT 
distributions. To this end, the behavioral parameters could be described as continuously 
distributed population parameters. The participation model would explain which 
travelers would participate under which rewarding schemes. However, adding this 
participation level adds another significant complexity to the model and is left for future 
research. In order to be able to redistribute the population in participants and non-
participants with different behavioral parameters, different reference scenarios are 
needed with different levels of participation. The non-participant PAT profile was 
adjusted such that the combined PAT profile is equal to the reference PAT profile 
(participation 0%) for which the model was calibrated. Since not the absolute outcomes 
are of interest, but mainly the comparisons between the strategies, our assumption of 
two groups of travelers is likely to give good indications about the differences between 
strategies. 
Not only the participation level is varied, but also the role of the reward level is 
investigated by considered the levels 1, 3, 5, and 7 euros in different strategies, 
assuming a participation level of 50%. The rewards are fixed over the morning peak, 
time-varying rewards over the morning peak will be dealt with in future research. In 
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total nine model runs have been performed, including three reference strategies. These 
model runs are indicated in Table 2. To give an indication of the computation time, each 
model run takes approximately 2.5 days on a desktop computer with an Intel Xeon 
3Ghz dual core processor. Model results and analyses are presented in the next 
subsection. 
Table 2: Overview of model runs. 
Reward / participation 10% 50% 100% 
0 euro reference reference reference 
1 euro -- X -- 
3 euro -- X -- 
5 euro X X X 
7 euro -- X -- 
 
3.3. Model results and analyses 
 
Departure profiles 
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Figure 6: Departure profiles of participants for different reward levels (50% participation). 
 
The departure time shifts of participants, presented in Figure 6 for 50% participation, 
account for the strongest behavioral responses that occur as a result of rewards. The 
morning peak is shown by the reference case of 0 euro reward. As the reward level 
increases, more travelers will change their departure time to the shoulder periods of the 
morning peak (before 7h30 and after 9h30). A large reward level may push almost all 
participants outside the morning peak. Although not depicted here, the departure 
profiles for the non-participants also change, as a reaction on the departure time changes 
of the participants. The morning peak period will become less congested; therefore 
some non-participants decide to return to the peak while they first traveled outside the 
peak period. The area underneath the departure profiles indicates the total travel demand 
for participants. Approximately 200 less travelers make a trip when they can gain a 
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reward of 1 euro, increasing to about 550 less travelers when a reward of 7 euros can be 
gained. 
 
Travel time savings 
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a. Total travel time savings for different reward levels (50% participation). 
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b. Total travel time savings for different participation levels (5 euro reward). 
 
Figure 7: Total travel time savings depending on reward and participation levels. 
 
As seen in the previous subsection, the rewards result in lower numbers of travelers in 
the morning peak period. Then congestion will decrease in the peak hours and the total 
travel time experienced by all users in the network in the morning peak will decrease, 
while the travel times just outside the peak period will increase. The aim of the 
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rewarding scheme is to have a positive net total travel time savings for the whole 
morning for all travelers. Depending on the reward and participation level, different 
total travel time savings result. 
In Figure 7(a) the total travel time savings are indicated for different reward levels, 
and also split between savings for participants and non-participants, assuming a 
participation level of 50%. The total travel time savings are largest for the 3 euro reward 
level, while higher rewards are less effective. The reason for this is that the total travel 
time savings for the non-participants become smaller and smaller (and even negative), 
while the participants experience more and more travel time savings (since they avoid 
the morning peak, mainly by departing earlier). The total travel time savings for the 
non-participants decreases since they experience more and earlier congestion with 
higher reward levels due to increased travel demand from the participants just before the 
morning peak. This indicates that higher reward levels do not necessarily yield better 
system wide traffic conditions. On the contrary, if the departure time shifts are too large, 
then the morning peak just shifts to the shoulders of the peak, leading to an earlier 
breakdown of traffic performance for the non-participant traveling in the early peak. A 
low reward level (1 or 3 euros) seems to perform best. 
A similar result is found by looking at the different participation levels. In Figure 7(b) 
the total travel time savings are depicted for varying participation levels, assuming a 
reward level of 5 euros. Higher participation levels lead to increased numbers of 
travelers shifting their departure time to the shoulders of the morning peak, increasing 
congestion at these time periods. Therefore, a mandatory reward scheme (100% 
participation) does not seem a good option. A 50% participation level performs best. 
 
 
Reward payments 
 
The total travel time savings in the previous subsection give an indication of the 
effectiveness of the rewarding strategy. Another interesting question is: which 
rewarding strategy provides the highest bang for the buck? To this end, we investigate 
the reward payments for each of the reward strategies. Figures 8(a) and 8(b) show the 
reward payments for the different reward levels (assuming 50% participation) and for 
different participation levels (assuming a reward level of 5 euros). Clearly, payments go 
up as the participation level or reward level increases. Using a 1 euro reward level is 
cheap, but also not very effective according to Figure 7(a). Table 3 presents how much 
reward payments need to be made for each hour of travel time savings. The first euros 
(reward levels of 1 or 3 euros) lead to significant decreases in total travel time, spending 
less than 8 euros for one hour of travel time savings. Reward levels of 5 euros or higher 
lead to diminishing total travel time savings per reward increase.  
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a. Total reward payments for different reward levels (50% participation). 
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b. Total reward payments for different participation levels (5 euro reward). 
 
Figure 8: Total reward payments depending on the reward and participation levels. 
 
Table 3: Reward payments per hour of travel time savings (euro/h). 
Reward / participation 10% 50% 100% 
1 euro -- € 7.01 -- 
3 euro -- € 7.83 -- 
5 euro € 18.96 € 25.42 € 47.29 
7 euro -- € 72.40 -- 
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4. Discussion, conclusions, and further research 
 
In this paper we have proposed a methodology and mathematical model to assess the 
effects of rewarding (and pricing) on a car transportation network. It is general in the 
sense that many different types of pricing or rewarding strategies could be included, 
varying from a fixed cordon charge to a time-varying kilometer charge, but also (time-
varying) rewards, which has been the focus of this paper. The model is applied to the 
The Hague region in the Netherlands, where in a small pilot study travelers could earn 3 
to 7 euros per day for avoiding the morning peak period. In the model study, the 
participation level is increased such that it enables the analyst to determine effects of a 
reward strategy on the traffic conditions. Different reward levels have been analyzed. It 
turns out that with a relatively low reward level (3 euro per day), a large shift in 
departure time choice is established, such that the peak period becomes less congested 
and there are overall network benefits in terms of total travel time savings. In case of 
high reward levels (5 to 7 euros per day) too many participants may change by leaving 
just before or after the morning peak, causing congestion at these time periods. In case 
of low reward levels, the participation level could be higher to achieve the largest 
benefits, although full participation is likely to be less effective again due to too many 
travelers shifting to periods just before or after the morning peak period. Hence, an 
optimal combination of reward level and participation rate could be determined, with 
low reward levels and high participation rates, or higher reward levels and lower 
participation rates. From a financial perspective, higher participation rates with low 
reward levels may be less costly in terms of rewards paid to travelers, as travelers seem 
to change their behavior already quite significantly with a low reward level, while high 
reward levels only contribute marginally to that. Combining the effectiveness with the 
financial aspect, a (relatively) low reward level of 3 euros with 50% participation seems 
to be the best option.  
Further research concentrates on two aspects: theoretical and empirical. From a 
theoretical and modeling point of view, the model proposed in this paper can be further 
improved by considering different classes of travelers with different VOT’s and 
different schedule delay preferences. Furthermore, a participation model will be added 
in the future, describing which travelers would (voluntarily) participate, considering a 
certain reward strategy. Empirically, results from the pilot study have been obtained for 
a short period of time (ten weeks), and long term effects are still uncertain. In a follow-
up experiment, a longer time period will be used to measure behavioral effects, and a 
time-varying reward level seems to be more effective as it may overcome problems that 
travelers decide to travel just before or after the peak hours. Instead, by offering a high 
reward level when avoiding driving during the most congested hour, and lower reward 
levels on less congested peak hours, travelers could be spread more in time. 
Additionally, a business case is proposed and offered to companies, in which their 
employees can participate in the Peak Avoidance project, while the companies 
contribute by paying the rewards. Such a scheme would no longer be a local measure on 
the corridor Zoetermeer – The Hague, but would be a country-wide implementation. 
Other business cases could be considered as well, such as a budget-neutral credit-based 
system, which is a combination of charging and rewarding, in which credits can be 
earned by avoiding the peak hours, while they can be spent by traveling during peak 
hours (Kockelman and Kalmanje, 2005). 
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Abstract 
 
This work aims at developing a demand-based methodology for designing the bus network of a small 
or medium town. The proposed modelling tool adopts a multi-agent objective function which evaluates 
performance in the context of different stakeholders: the surplus of travellers (car and bus users); the bus 
service provider’s revenues and operation costs. This approach was applied to an existing bus network, 
serving Trapani, which is a medium town in the south of Italy (Sicily), with 100000 inhabitants. The bus-
based public transport system attracts only about 5% of commuter trips within Trapani (source: National 
Institute of Statistics, 2005). This paper reports on an analysis of the application of the proposed multi-
agent modelling tool to two planning scenarios: the first is short-term and characterized by a budget 
constraint (slight changes in the availability of drivers and vehicles) and the second long-term with new 
investments in new buses to improve services and increase patronage. In both cases, the impact of the 
recent car park charging policy launched by the local administration was considered. 
The decision variables for the optimisation procedure were route, service frequency and capacity of 
each bus line. A random utility model was employed to forecast the mode choices for trips within Trapani 
and the travel demand-supply equilibrium was obtained using the DUE (deterministic user equilibrium) 
assignment algorithm, for private transport, and the hyperpath network loading algorithm, for public 
transport. 
The optimisation procedure led to a more efficient bus network characterized by increase in bus 
frequencies and a better performance in terms of reduced travel time, especially for trips bound for the 
“old town” in the morning. In addition, a higher number of origin-destination pairs were served, at the 
expense of the need to interchange between the inner more frequent and the outer less frequent services. 
This implied that the number of transfers from one bus line to another significantly increased. 
 
Keywords: Urban public transport; Bus network design; Park pricing; Mode choice simulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on a methodological approach for planning the public transport 
service of a small or medium town, subject to demand management strategies such as 
car park charging. The proposed approach was applied to the urban area of Trapani, an 
Italian town (in Sicily) with 100000 inhabitants. The layout of the town centre can be 
described as “funnel”-shaped (see Figure 1, where the “old town” and the “Fardella” 
zone, the main commercial area, are indicated). The town suffers acute traffic 
congestion during the morning (7:30-8:30) and afternoon (17:30-19:30) peak-periods, 
which is exacerbated by insufficient car parking spaces. Recently in an attempt to 
resolve this problem, the Town Council adopted a car park charging plan which aims to 
increase the availability of parking areas for short-stay users and to persuade commuters 
to use more remote car parks or the park and ride facility provided at Ilio (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The centre of Trapani. 
 
The existing public transport system consists of long, in terms of both distance and 
time, bus routes with low service frequencies implying a lack of competition; in fact, 
only about 5% of commuter trips within Trapani are served by bus (see Tables 1 and 2). 
This paper in section 2 presents the state of the art of transit network design followed 
by a description in section 3 of the modelling framework; section 4 deals with mode 
choice behaviour modelling; section 5 highlights the characteristics of the bus network 
adopted as initial input for the design procedure; section 6 presents the analysis of the 
results along with some comments and finally in section 7 conclusions are drawn. 
Table 1 exhibits service characteristics in terms of relative average speed and 
headway for central area compared to suburban and external lines. 
Table 2 clearly shows the unpopularity of the bus as a commuting mode. This is due 
to the low values of service frequency and running speed. 
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Table 1: The current public transport service in Trapani. 
Bus lines Number 
of lines 
Total 
number of 
buses 
Total 
Length 
(km) 
Average 
Length 
(km) 
Average 
running 
time 
(min.) 
Average 
speed 
(km/h) 
Headway 
(min.) 
“Old Town” 2 3 10 5 29 10.2 22 
Suburban 8 16 106 13.2 120 13.1 38 
External* 2 4 98 49.1 117 25.1 58 
Note: * Linking Trapani to some nearby rural zones. 
Table 2:The transport mode-based distribution of commuter trips in Trapani (7:30-8:30 a. m.). 
Mode (%) 
Bus 5.5 
Car 65.9 
Motorbike 8.2 
Other 20.4 
Total 100.00 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, 2005. 
 
This paper presents an analytical framework to tackle the problems faced by the bus 
service provider in Trapani. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
The transit network design problem is usually formulated as a non linear optimisation 
problem with both discrete and continuous variables and associated constraints. The 
most effective solution approaches employ heuristic methods and evidence of this is 
presented below. 
Ceder and Israeli (1993) adopted a mathematical programming-based transit network 
design approach which, as a first step, created a wide set of feasible routes in order to 
connect every node to all others. Next, the design procedure identified the minimum 
number of subsets of routes by solving a set covering problem and searched for the 
optimal subset through a multi-objective analysis. 
Baaj and Mahmassani (1995) used an artificial intelligence heuristic algorithm which 
selected a given number of high demand origin-destination pairs and designed a starting 
network framework to connect these o-d pairs through the shortest routes. This initial 
network was progressively extended according to a node selection strategy based on 
trade-offs between performance measures and costs. 
Ramirez and Seneviratne (1996) proposed an approach for route network design 
based on GIS applications. This assigned an impedance factor to each possible route and 
selected the set of routes minimising impedance. 
Pattnaik et al. (1998) described a methodology for identifying optimal routes and 
service frequencies which employed a genetic algorithm. In particular, they 
implemented a two step procedure: first, a set of feasible routes was generated and then 
a genetic algorithm was used to select the optimum route configuration. 
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Soehodo and Koshi (1999) tackled the problem of designing transit routes and 
frequencies by formulating a programming problem that takes into account, in addition 
to traditional aspects such as minimal frequency and fleet size constraints, private car 
user costs, transit passenger crowding, transfer time and inconvenience. 
Bielli et al. (2002) illustrated another approach for designing a bus network by using a 
genetic algorithm. They proposed a model that, at each iteration of the genetic 
algorithm, performed demand assignment on each network of the current set of derived 
solutions (feasible networks) and calculated performance indicators based on the 
assignment results. 
Carrese and Gori (2002) developed a bus network design model consisting of two 
stages. In the first, the model constructed the transit network through heuristic 
procedures based on flow concentration, in the second stage, it identified the main and 
feeder lines. 
Yan and Chen (2002) adopted a method for network design (routes and timetables) 
that optimised the relationship between bus service supply and traveller demand, 
through the construction of two time-space networks, which considered both a fleet and 
a passenger flow network. 
Lee and Vuchic (2005) developed an iterative design strategy that optimised a starting 
network which consisted of the shortest routes connecting all the origin-destination 
pairs. This procedure eliminated the less efficient routes by taking into account mode 
choice behaviour. 
Montella and Gallo (2002) proposed a methodology based on a repeated interaction 
between the analyst, who modified routes according to a feedback on the variation of 
the passenger occupancy factor and the demand-supply ratio, and an automated 
procedure, which was used for optimising bus line frequencies. Moreover, they assumed 
a fixed-demand for public transport and allowed for the trade-off between service 
provider’s costs and user’s costs. 
The research described in this paper was inspired by Montella and Gallo, but presents 
some additional features by explicitly taking into account commuter mode choice and 
consequently adopts a multi-agent objective function consisting of the perceived utility 
of travellers (car and bus users) as well as the bus transport operator’s revenues and 
operation costs in the performance measure used in the optimisation. 
The next section details the proposed modelling framework. 
 
 
3. Modelling framework 
 
In order to design the future bus network of Trapani, the multi-agent objective 
function is defined as: 
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where, 
 
TPbus - one-way trip bus ticket price (euros).This was computed by dividing the 
monthly ticket price by 44 trips per month. 
 Bus
o dD −  - demand for public transport (passengers/hour) referring to origin-destination 
o-d pair. This was estimated through a mode choice random utility model and was 
valid for the morning peak hour (7:30-8:30). 
R - vector of the various bus routes. 
F - vector of the various bus service frequencies (buses/hour). 
Cbus - public transport average cost (3.5 euros/bus-km). This was estimated in 
accordance with the balance sheets (2005-2007) of the company supplying bus 
services in Trapani. 
Fj - service frequency of bus line j (buses/hour). 
Lj - length of bus line j (km). 
βc - coefficient associated with the monetary cost attributes of the mode choice 
random utility model (euros-1). 
( )( ) ( )( )ln exp , exp ,Car Buso d o d o dS V V− − − = + R F R F - commuter surplus (maximum 
perceived utility) for origin-destination o-d pair (dimensionless). 
)Bus(Car
doV − - systematic utility relative to the “Car” (“Bus”) alternative and link o-d 
(dimensionless). 
Do-d - total travel demand for pair o-d (travellers/hour) consistent with the morning 
peak hour. 
Fmax(min) - maximum (minimum) level of bus service frequency (Fmin = 2 buses/hour; 
Fmax = 15 buses/hour). 
Sjs - binary variable that is 1 if the type s bus is assigned to line j, 0 otherwise. 
njs - number of types s vehicles assigned to bus line j. 
NBs - total number of available types s buses. 
Caps - maximum number of passengers both standing and sitting in a type s bus. 
 
max
jD - maximum number of travellers using bus line j during the 7:30-8:30 hour. 
 
hi
jD - number of travellers using bus line j on line arc hi of the bus network during 
7:30-8:30. 
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, jhi
doA −  - binary variable that is 1 if bus line j is included in the optimal hyperpath to 
move from origin o to destination d and line arc hi is part of the whole o-d route, 0 
otherwise. 
DBus(Car) - demand vector for bus (car) that consists of the various origin-destination 
flows (travellers/hour) and results from the application of the mode choice random 
utility model. 
BusDˆ  - demand vector for the “Bus” option, obtained by a hyperpath deterministic 
network loading of DBus (Cascetta, 2001; Ortùzar and Willumsen, 1994). 
CarDˆ  - demand vector for the “Car” option that stems from a DUE assignment of DCar 
(Cascetta, 2001; Ortùzar and Willumsen, 1994). 
 
Thus, this objective function considers the interests of different stakeholders, namely 
the bus service provider’s revenues and operation costs and the car and bus users’ 
surplus. 
In detail, consistent with a bilevel optimisation approach, we solved two nested 
problems: 
 
- an upper level problem: that consists of maximising the objective function 
through the bus network routes, considering, for each line, the bus occupancy 
factor variation (passengers/vehicle)1 and the ratio of demand (passengers-km) to 
supply2 (seats-km)3; 
- a lower level problem: that aims to maximise the objective function through the 
bus service frequencies and set the capacity of each line depending on the 
availability of vehicles and drivers and the demand for public transport. The latter 
is forecasted by a random utility model which simulates the competition between 
bus and car. 
 
In order to solve the problem defined by (1), we employed a step-by-step design 
algorithm (see flow diagram presented in Figure 2). At each iteration a network 
configuration, that is better than the previous one, is generated, for the morning rush 
hour of a working day (7:30-8:30)4, by first solving the upper level problem followed by 
the lower level one. The resulting bus network is tested against the variation of the bus 
occupancy factor and the demand-supply ratio, so that if some bus lines show 
unsatisfactory values of these indicators, their routes can be modified and a new 
iteration of the bilevel optimisation process can be performed. 
                                                 
 
1
 This analysis allows the planner to gear supply to demand; for example, if a bus line presents a section 
with a very low occupancy factor, this part of the line path should be eliminated. 
2
 It is calculated as follows: Bus Capacity (seats/bus) x Service Frequency (buses/hour) x Bus Line Length 
(km). 
3
 From the point of view of efficiency, a condition of equality between supply and demand would be the 
best solution. 
4
 Within this time window, commuter trips are prevalent, as emerges from the output of a survey 
conducted by the authors on the bus service demand in Trapani (Amoroso, Migliore, Catalano and 
Galatioto, 2008): in detail, during 7:30-8:30, the authors found out that students and workers travelling by 
bus are 525, while the total demand consists of 868 users. 
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By way of example, consider a bus line which presents a section of route with a high 
bus occupancy factor and another one with a low value of this indicator. The bilevel 
optimiser will provide two lines characterized by different service capacities. 
At the first step, the method was applied to an initial proposed bus network, with 
routes set to improve the current level of service efficiency. 
 
Figure 2: The bus network design algorithm. 
 
 
Optimise the objective function by 
the bus line frequencies and set the 
service capacities 
Consider as final solution 
the preceding iteration 
bus network and STOP 
Is the Objective 
Function better ? N 
Y 
Analyse each bus line according to 
the variation of the occupancy 
factor and the demand-supply 
ratio 
Consider as final solution 
the current iteration bus 
network and STOP 
Are there bus lines 
with problems ? 
Y 
Mode choice model 
- Hyperpath network loading for 
public transport 
- DUE assignment for private 
transport 
N 
Analyse each current bus line 
according to the variation of the 
occupancy factor and the demand-
supply ratio 
Improve the bus line routes 
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4. Mode choice behaviour modelling 
 
The transport mode choice behaviour for commuter trips within the urban area of 
Trapani was simulated using a multinomial logit model based on Ben Akiva and 
Lerman (1985). The following formulations refer to the one-way trip systematic utility 
functions associated with the alternative transport modes and containing only the 
attributes that proved statistically significant based on t-ratio. 
 
CARTCTV CARPARKINGTTRAVELCTRAVELTCAR PARKINGTRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= ββββ  (3) 
 
TRAVELCTRAVELTSPORTPUBLICTRAN CTV TRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅= ββ  (4) 
 
where, 
 
Vj: systematic part of the alternative j utility function; 
TTRAVEL: one-way trip travel time (minutes); 
CTRAVEL: one-way trip travel cost (euros); 
TPARKING: parking time (minutes); 
CAR (1/0): alternative specific attribute for the “Car” option; 
β
TTRAVEL
 , β
CTRAVEL
 , β
TPARKING
 , β
CAR
: coefficients. 
 
For car, the travel time attribute is the sum of the time spent moving from one’s own 
house to the trip starting point, the time spent moving from the trip start to the trip end 
and the time to reach the destination from the parking lot (trip end). For public 
transport, the travel time variable consists of the following elements: the time spent 
walking to and from stops, the waiting time at the bus stop, the in-vehicle time and, in 
the case of an interchange between two services, the transfer time, with a component of 
walk and wait. In the case of car, the travel cost variable consists of the following 
components: the travel cost derived by multiplying the cost per kilometre by the 
distance travelled and the fixed cost for park. For public transport, the travel cost is 
based on the season (monthly) ticket price for a bus user in Trapani. 
The logit model was calibrated by adjusting (Cascetta, 2001) coefficients drawn from 
a previous study (Catalano, Lo Casto and Migliore, 2007)5, so as to consider the specific 
characteristics of the transport system of Trapani defined by an analysis of the data set 
collected from a recent survey on mode choice behaviour in Trapani. Table 3 shows the 
adjusted model parameters, while Figure 3 presents, for the existing bus services, the 
comparison between the flows of passengers derived from the survey and the flows 
from the logit model for the morning peak period (7:30-8:30 a.m.) 
 
 
                                                 
 
5
 We refer to a work concerning the calibration of a demand model for predicting the modal split of the 
urban transport demand in Palermo, under a future scenario characterized by the availability of car 
sharing and car pooling. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for the multinomial logit model. 
Attribute Adjusted Coefficient t-ratio P value 
TTRAVEL (min.) -0.03 -9.33 0.00 
CTRAVEL (€) -0.29 -10.58 0.00 
TPARKING (min.) -0.11 -8.09 0.00 
CAR (1/0) 2.96 11.63 0.00 
Notes: ρ2 (constants only) = 0.04; Value of time (Ttravel/Ctravel): 5.40 €/h. 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of the public transport demand from surveys with that derived from the logit 
model. 
 
Under the bus frequency optimisation process, for every origin-destination pair, the 
modal split was determined using the model described above, whose attributes were 
estimated as follows: 
 
- the time spent travelling by car from the trip start to the trip end was quantified by 
a DUE assignment of the origin-destination matrix which represented the private 
transport demand of Trapani. 
- The parking time was estimated at 3 minutes based on a previous study 
concerning the park demand-supply system of Trapani (Amoroso, Migliore, 
Catalano and Galatioto, 2007). 
- For the town centre area subject to the car park charging policy, the time taken to 
reach the destination from the parking lot was calculated taking into account the 
parking spaces that, under the aforesaid policy, commuters will be able to use 
either paying nothing or paying long-stay fares. 
- The travel cost of one-way trip by car was estimated by assuming the perceived 
cost of 0.1 € per kilometre (fuel consumption). This perceived cost was multiplied 
by the length of the optimal route identified through a DUE assignment procedure. 
- The cost of parking was determined in accordance with the parking policy 
recently launched by Trapani Town Council. 
- The waiting time at the bus stop (or at bus stops if travellers use bus-bus 
interchange) was computed by multiplying the headway by 0.7. In this way the 
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distribution of passenger arrivals was simulated under the assumption that the bus 
service is not perfectly regular. 
- The in-bus time was quantified by a hyperpath deterministic network loading of 
the origin-destination matrix representing the public transport demand of Trapani. 
- The public transport cost per one-way trip was estimated on the basis of the 
season ticket price for a commuter using the bus service in Trapani. This was 
assumed to be 0.7 euros estimated by dividing the monthly ticket price by an 
expected usage of 44 trips. 
- The time spent walking to and from stops or parking lots and the waiting time 
were doubled, since in real life their impact on passenger is greater than the in-
vehicle time. 
 
The simulation of public transport demand was carried out based on the following 
assumptions: students and elderly using the bus have no alternative; car users working 
or studying inside the town centre, where the described parking policy will be in force, 
will be induced to use the free parking facility at Ilio (see Fig. 1) and ride with bus6; 
commuters and students coming from other satellite towns by train walk or use bus 
services to reach their destination. Hence, these three groups of users represent an 
exogenous demand for bus transport. 
 
 
5. The initial solution of the bus network design problem 
 
As stated above, at the initial step, the planning algorithm was applied to a base bus 
network whose paths were designed to increase efficiency by improving the average 
ratio of demand (passengers-km) to supply (seats-km). An “All or Nothing” assignment 
of the origin-destination matrix representing the total transport demand of Trapani7 was 
performed to identify the principal trip generation and attraction zones of the study area 
as well as the routes preferred by users. Figure 4 gives the current public transport 
network in Trapani and Figure 5 illustrates the initial designed bus network. This 
network consists of the following elements: a leader bus service (line 1) with a high 
capacity serving the town centre and the parking area for car-bus interchange; one 
service (line 2) connects the park and ride facility with the “old town”; another service 
(line 3) penetrates the “old town”; two feeder services (lines 5 and 6) link the 
developing suburban area in the south of Trapani with the town centre through a transfer 
to the leader line; three services (lines 4, 7 and 8) connect the suburban area in the north 
of Trapani with the town centre and the park and ride facility and lastly three external 
services that were drawn from the present public transport system and were not 
changed, because they represent a minimum standard public transport service for nearby 
and small rural areas under the municipal administration of Trapani. 
Finally, compared to the current situation, the base bus network requires only three 
additional buses and drivers to be assigned to the internal lines. 
                                                 
 
6
 The estimation of such a demand derives from a previous study that led to the park pricing plan for 
Trapani centre (Amoroso, Migliore, Catalano and Galatioto, 2007). 
7
 In relation to the 7:30-8:30 morning peak hour of a working day (2007). 
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6. Computational results 
 
The above methodology was applied to two future scenarios: 
 
- a short-term scenario based on the budget constraint that, at each iteration of the 
transit network design algorithm, for the lower level problem, the variation of the 
difference between bus service revenues and operation costs remained positive 
with respect to the preceding iteration: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 1 1, , 0Bus t t t Bus t t t t tBus o d o d Bus j j j
o d j
TP D D C F F L− − −− −
−
 ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ ≥ ∑ ∑R F R F  (5) 
 
where t represents a generic iteration of the step-by-step bus network design algorithm. 
For the definitions of other variables see section 3. 
 
 
Figure 4: Current public transport network of Trapani. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 41-56 
 
 
 
52 
 
Figure 5: Initial solution of the bus network design problem. 
 
- a long-term scenario taking into account the possibility of new investments in 
vehicles and human resources by relaxing the budget constraint to restrict the 
deficit margin to the value of 300 euros during the morning rush hour. This 
represents an estimate of the subsidy required for public transport that could be 
met from the charges derived from the parking policy introduced in Trapani 
centre. Using the same definitions as above, the corresponding budget constrain 
for the long-term scenario is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 1 1, , 300Bus t t t Bus t t t t tBus o d o d Bus j j j
o d j
TP D D C F F L− − −− −
−
 ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ ≥− ∑ ∑R F R F  (6) 
 
This threshold of 300 euros was obtained considering that, according to the above 
park charging plan, during the week and for 10 hours daily, 1542 car parks in the town 
centre can be used paying a fixed fare of 0.8 euros/hour and assuming that on average a 
revenue generating parking lot is used for 5 hours a day. An additional assumption was 
that one third of the annual revenues are invested in improving the quality of urban 
public transport by increasing the capacity for the main services during the morning8. 
Under the short-term scenario, the base bus network resulted in the optimal one, 
whilst the long-term simulation required eleven additional buses (and drivers)9 assigned 
                                                 
 
8
 The survey conducted on the urban public transport of Trapani in 2007 (Amoroso, Migliore, Catalano 
and Galatioto, 2008) pointed out that the demand for bus services falls sharply in the afternoon time: 
about 4380 users during the 6:00-14:00 period against about 1320 users during the 14:00-19:00 period. 
9
 28 vehicles and drivers for the internal bus lines instead of 17 at present. 
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to regular services, without modifying the initial routes. Tables 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the 
future scenarios on the bus service of Trapani in comparison with the present situation. 
The first comment on the outcomes concerns the possibility of investments: under the 
long-term scenario, the model suggests that the additional financial resources should be 
spent on global development of the public transport supply, so as to achieve a headway 
of less than 10 minutes, for both the leader and historic centre services, and of 20 
minutes for the suburban lines. 
The second, as can be seen in Tables 4, 5 and 6, under the short-term and long-term 
scenarios, a rise of 110-120% in the demand for public transport mainly due to the 
parking policy implementation is forecasted. In relation to the very inefficient lines 
serving the developing suburban area area in the south of Trapani10, the average ratio of 
demand to supply increases considerably from the current value at 0.14 to 0.20 in the 
short term and 0.18 in the long term; consequently, the efficiency improves. 
Furthermore, with respect to the current scenario, the average origin-destination transit 
time is reduced by 6.4% and 15% in the short term and in the long term respectively. 
The biggest performance improvement occurs for trips into the “old town”: in this case, 
the average o-d transit time is reduced by 19% under the short-term solution and by 
27% in the other case. 
Finally, the model application leads to a 5% rise of the number of o-d pairs served, at 
the expense of the number of o-d connections implying a transfer from one bus line to 
another (interchange), which increases by 77%. 
Table 4: The current bus network of Trapani (7:30-8:30 a.m. peak hour). 
  Bus lines11 
  10 11 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 
Length (km) 4.4 5.6 10.5 10.2 10.0 18.8 14.3 8.7 19.3 
Running time12 (hour) 28 30 49 50 51 72 59 43 83 
Bus line demand13 (passengers/hour) 127 90 131 102 146 29 85 63 95 
Number of buses 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 
Frequency (buses/hour) 4.3 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.4 0.8 2.0 2.8 2.2 
Headway (minutes) 14.0 30.0 24.5 25.0 25.5 72.0 29.5 21.5 27.7 
Supply (passengers/hour) 146 100 233 223 224 42 228 265 206 
Max demand (passengers/hour) 72 56 67 57 84 25 42 35 50 
(Demand x km) / (Supply x km) 0.30 0.48 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Total demand = 868 
Number of served origin-destination pairs = 1040 
Number of served origin-destination pairs implying a transfer = 300 
Average origin-destination travel time (minutes) = 47 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the historic centre (minutes) = 48 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the main commercial area (minutes) = 41 
 
                                                 
 
10
 The number of which is reduced by the design procedure: from lines 24, 25, 26 and 28 at present to 
lines 5 and 6 under the project. 
11
 Excluding the external lines that were not changed (see section 5). 
12
 Including the time for driver break. 
13
 Passengers using bus-bus interchange are considered to estimate the demands for both bus services 
used. 
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Table 5: The optimal bus network for Trapani under the short-term scenario (7:30-8:30 a.m. peak hour). 
  Bus lines 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Length (km) 8.1 7.5 3.8 10.7 11.1 13.3 13.1 14 
Running time (hour) 48 35 25 50 51 49 55 56 
Bus line demand (passengers/hour) 674 592 183 110 163 81 161 162 
Number of buses 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Frequency (buses/hour) 6.29 5.12 4.79 2.40 2.35 2.45 2.19 2.14 
Headway (minutes) 10 12 13 25 26 25 27 28 
Supply (passengers/hour) 688 579 144 228 224 144 208 203 
Max demand (passengers/hour) 373 552 134 110 88 71 92 117 
(Demand x km) / (Supply x km) 0.23 0.34 0.48 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.33 
Objective function (euros) = 158838 
∆Revenues - ∆Running costs (euros) = 0 
Logit model-based demand (passengers/hour) = 320 
Car-bus intermodalism demand (passengers/hour) = 797 
Students and elderly (passengers/hour) = 662 
Train-bus intermodalism demand (passengers/hour) = 39 
Total demand = 1818 
Number of served origin-destination pairs = 1095 
Number of served origin-destination pairs implying a transfer = 530 
Average origin-destination travel time (minutes) = 44 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the historic centre (minutes) = 39 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the main commercial area (minutes) = 37 
Table 6: The optimal bus network for Trapani under the long-term scenario (7:30-8:30 a.m. peak-hour). 
  Bus lines 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Length (km) 8.1 7.5 3.8 10.7 11.1 13.3 13.1 14 
Running time (hour) 48 35 25 50 51 49 55 56 
Bus line demand (passengers/hour) 693 597 203 131 168 85 176 170 
Number of buses 7 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Frequency (buses/hour) 8.81 6.83 7.19 3.6 3.53 2.45 3.28 3.21 
Headway (minutes) 7 9 8 17 17 25 18 19 
(Demand x km) / (Supply x km) 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.24 
Objective function (euros) = 158929 
∆Revenues - ∆Running costs (euros) = - 292 
Logit model-based demand (passengers/hour) = 389 
Car-bus intermodalism demand (passengers/hour) = 797 
Students and elderly (passengers/hour) = 662 
Train-bus intermodalism demand (passengers/hour) = 39 
Total demand = 1887 
Number of served origin-destination pairs = 1095 
Number of served origin-destination pairs implying a transfer = 530 
Average origin-destination travel time (minutes) = 40 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the historic centre (minutes) = 35 
Average origin-destination travel time to reach the main commercial area (minutes) = 34 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has demonstrated the feasibility of a novel transit network design 
methodology by optimising a real size bus network, which serves Trapani, a medium 
town in the south of Italy (Sicily), with 100000 inhabitants and a low demand for public 
transport. 
The proposed method consists of an iterative design strategy that optimises a base 
(current) network using a feedback algorithm based on the variation of the bus 
occupancy factor and the demand-supply ratio, explicitly allowing for mode choice 
behaviour. 
Moreover, the model, by adopting a multi-agent objective function (reflecting both 
travellers and bus service provider), designs bus service routes, frequencies and 
capacities, for two planning scenarios: a short-term scenario characterized by a budget 
constraint (slight changes in the availability of drivers and vehicles) and a long-term 
scenario which considers the possibility of new investments in service quality. In both 
cases the impact of the parking policy recently agreed by the local administration is 
taken into account. 
The simulation of public transport demand was carried out based on the following 
assumptions: students and elderly using the bus have no alternative; car users working 
or studying inside the town centre, where the described parking policy will be in force, 
will be induced to use a free parking facility outside the centre and ride with bus; 
commuters and students coming from other satellite towns by train walk or use bus 
services to reach their destination. 
The optimisation procedure yielded a more efficient and effective bus network which 
required 77% increase in bus-bus interchange and characterized as follows: higher ratios 
of demand to supply particularly for the services linking the developing suburban area 
in the south of Trapani with the town centre; a better performance in terms of travel 
time, especially for trips into the “old town”; a higher number of o-d served pairs, but at 
the expense of the number of o-d connections implying a transfer from one bus service 
to another, which increases significantly. As regards the demand “captured” by the 
optimised transit system of Trapani, it mainly consists of individuals using the park and 
ride facility outside the centre: 797 passengers/hour, while the total demand is of 1818 
passengers/hour under the short-term project and 1887 passengers/hour under the long-
term scenario. 
We did not deal with the problem of optimising the external lines that at present 
connect Trapani with the nearby rural zones, characterized by a “weak” travel demand. 
So, a development direction of this research could be to compare the proposed solution 
with the possibility of linking Trapani by bus to dispersed areas of residences perhaps 
also considering innovative approaches based on dial and ride and other bespoke 
services. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a study on the impact of investment in the Betuweroute and alternative transport 
pricing schemes on port competition between Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp. The Betuweroute is a 
160 kilometre dedicated freight railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam with the German Ruhr area. 
If the line could, in the near or more remote future, attract a large share of transit freight, it will be of 
considerable importance for the competitive position of the port of Rotterdam relative to Hamburg and 
Antwerp. We use a transport network model that includes the three ports and allows for transport by road, 
rail and inland waterways to and from the Ruhr area. We run model simulations for scenario’s with and 
without the Betuweroute and with and without marginal social cost pricing. The results show that, 
although the Betuweroute is a welfare reducing investment, it may indeed be of crucial importance to the 
port of Rotterdam. 
 
Keywords: Transport pricing; Rail investment; Betuweroute; Port competition. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the past, ports were fairly insulated from competitive forces, each port serving its 
own, more or less captive hinterland (Haralambides, 2002). Trade barriers, national 
borders and inadequate hinterland infrastructure were mainly responsible for this 
situation. Nowadays, European ports are facing major external challenges, including the 
grouping of container shipping lines into powerful consortia, resulting in downward 
pressure on prices, increased efficiency levels in maritime transport and the importance 
of logistical chains (Farrell, 1999). These developments, in combination with trade 
liberalisation associated with the emergence of a single internal EU market and 
technological changes, have had a considerable impact on trade flows and hence on the 
port industry. The result is a competitive market situation in which hinterlands are no 
longer captives of the port with which they have the best connection. The mobility of 
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the transhipment container, together with intertwined land transport networks have 
simultaneously extended the hinterlands of all ports and intensified competition among 
these ports (Haralambides, 2002). Today, it makes little difference if a container from 
Asia destined for Duisburg will pass through the port of Hamburg, Rotterdam or 
Antwerp. 
Competition concentrates on the extensive port-based logistic chains that developed 
in close relationship with the containerisation (Meersman et al., 2002). It is important 
for ports to belong to a successful logistic chain of a particular freight flow and for this 
purpose efficiency and other characteristics of the ports themselves are important, but 
also the connections with the hinterland. An adequate transport infrastructure, which 
should not be limited to a single mode, is an important element in any attempt to retain 
or increase market share. 
The Betuweroute is such a potentially important transport axis. It is a 160 kilometre 
dedicated freight railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam with the German 
hinterland. This project is interesting since political decision making and calculations on 
its profitability were based on questionable assumptions (see Section 2). The 
construction of the Betuweroute was motivated by two main reasons (TCI, 2004 and 
Algemene Rekenkamer, 2000). The first reason for construction was to consolidate the 
(economic) position of the port of Rotterdam as one of Europe’s key transport and 
distribution hubs (employment) and to facilitate the expected growth in freight traffic in 
the Netherlands. The second reason was environmental in nature; rail is considered as a 
relatively environmental friendly mode of transport and the Betuweroute was expected 
to be a realistic substitute for road transport. In this paper we use a transport network 
model to assess whether construction of the Betuweroute indeed contributes to these 
two goals. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some ex-ante 
assessments of the Betuweroute. In Section 3 we present the transport model and 
transport network used for our analyses, while Section 4 discusses the modelling 
scenarios and the inputs of the model. In Section 5 we present the simulation results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Ex-ante assessments of the Betuweroute 
 
The Betuweroute project comprises an upgrade of the existing Rotterdam Port 
Railway, which runs from the Europoort at Maasvlakte via the Waalhaven container rail 
service centre to the Kijfhoek shunting yard, and constructing of a new double-track line 
that parallels the A15 motorway to the German border near Emmerich. It links the port 
of Rotterdam to the existing German rail network at the Dutch/German border. The 
government decision to build the Betuweroute was taken in 1994 and was ratified by a 
committee and parliament in 1995. Work to upgrade the port railway started in 1997. 
Construction of embankments, tunnels and bridges for the A15 line began in 1998. The 
Betuweroute is the first double-track railway line in the Netherlands dedicated to freight 
transport. It was completed in July 2007. Total costs amount about 4.7 billion Euro 
according to recent estimates. The 25-tonne axle load Betuweroute will have a capacity 
of 10 trains per hour in each direction. Top speed will be 120 km/h and trains are 
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expected to take between one-and-a-half and two hours to travel the 160 kilometres 
from Rotterdam to the German border. 
The completion of the Betuweroute ends a period of about 25 years of planning, 
research, construction and last, but certainly not least, discussion. The railway line has 
been very controversial for many reasons. The analyses of social costs and benefits of 
the route to be discussed in the present section played a major role in the decision 
making process. A first assessment of the Betuweroute is by Knight Wendling and it 
was concluded that (Knight Wendling, 1991, p. 26): “the necessity of construction is 
endorsed by economic and social issues like environmental concern, infrastructure 
capacity and economic cost/benefit ratio. Also from an international perspective the 
Betuwe freight railway route is an indispensable link to execute EU-policy and to react 
appropriately to the changing position of road traffic.” In the next year this conclusion 
was documented by a ‘macro-economic and social cost-benefit analysis of the Betuwe 
route’ (Knight Wendling, 1992) that stated that until 2010 tax revenues with a present 
value of 5.4 billion Euro would be forgone if the Betuwe route would not be 
constructed. Improvement of inland waterway transport could limit this loss to 3.45 
billion Euro. The costs of the Betuweroute were estimated to be around 2.36 billion 
Euro and it was expected that this investment would be paid back completely by 2000. 
The Knight Wendling conclusion is remarkable for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, Knight Wendling was asked by Dutch Railways (NS) to compare two 
alternatives: a reference case in which freight transport by rail would completely 
disappear, and one in which freight transport would grow to 65 million ton per year. 
The latter figure was based on a target set by NS, which is generally considered as 
ambitious. This implies that Knight Wendling did not itself assess the effect of 
construction of the Betuweroute on freight transport. In other words, the direct effect of 
the Betuwe route on the development of the volume of freight transport was taken as 
given (that is, incorporated in the self-imposed target set by NS) rather than estimated. 
Also, the reasoning in the Knight Wendling report is macro economic and stresses the 
indirect or secondary effects. Later on it became clear that a substantial part of the 
effects reported by Knight Wendling were ‘image’ effects for the Rotterdam port that 
are absent in conventional economic models. 
The large macro-economic benefits suggest that it is unnecessary to care much about 
the returns to the investment in terms of user fees. The capital invested in the Betuwe 
route would soon be paid back by (other) tax revenues, at least if the optimistic 
assumptions about the development of freight transport were accepted. A later analysis 
by the CPB (1993) concluded that even after subtraction of the ‘image’ effects the 
Betuwe route still appeared to be a worthwhile investment. The CPB report, however, 
also did not provide an independent assessment of the development of freight transport 
in general, let alone of the demand for transport over the Betuwe route. In fact, an 
independent assessment that investigated the demand for freight transport over the 
Betuweroute under particular conditions of price and quality was never conducted. 
The Knight Wendling analysis took for granted that that the voluminous flows of 
goods to be transported by rail in the ambitious NS scenario made it necessary that a 
new route should be constructed. However, from a CPB (1995) study it is clear that 
upgrading the Rotterdam Port Railway and doubling the existing railway between 
Rotterdam and Utrecht served to postpone any capacity problems for freight transport to 
(at least) 2009. Recent figures by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) indicate that about 29 
mln tonnes of freight were transported by rail in 2005 in the Netherlands (see 
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http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en) and there are no serious indications of capacity 
problems even though the Rotterdam-Utrecht railroad has not been doubled and the 
Betuwe route was not yet available.1 Moreover, there appears to be no interest at all in 
freight transport over the Betuwe route immediately after its completion in July 2007. 
We conclude therefore that even this seemingly trivial step in the argument was less 
innocent than it seems to be at first sight. 
Also the assumptions on the environmental superiority of rail transport can be 
questioned. A study by the RIVM compared the environmental effects of transporting 
an equal amount of freight by road and rail, and found relatively modest differences (see 
Van Wee et al., 1994). Moreover, early environmental assessments ignore new 
developments in truck technology that mitigate the environmental damage caused by 
trucks. It was also pointed out that the Betuweroute was expected to generate a 
substantial amount of additional freight, which would increase pollution, etc. The 
conclusion emerged that the environmental effects of the Betuweroute could safely be 
ignored. 
In view of these conclusions the most surprising aspect of the Betuweroute appears to 
be that so many people were convinced that neglecting this opportunity for investment 
in rail infrastructure would cause significant damage to the Dutch economy. A tentative 
explanation for this conviction could be the following. At the end of the 1980s there 
was considerable anxiousness among Rotterdam entrepreneurs about the future of road 
transport: congestion problems and environmental policies were regarded as major 
threats to the fast and cheap transport towards the German hinterland. In particular, 
there was concern about the better rail connection of Hamburg and the emerging plans 
to improve the railway connection between the port of Antwerp and Germany by 
upgrading the so-called ‘Iron Rhine’. Clearly, the construction of a modern railway 
dedicated to freight transport and providing a direct connection between Rotterdam and 
Germany would imply a major competitive advantage in case rail transport would 
indeed become an important substitute for the use of trucks. These strategic 
considerations were combined with ambitions of Dutch railways who regarded the 
Betuweroute as the last opportunity to save its cargo division and the willingness of 
Dutch politicians to invest substantially in (apparently) environment-friendly transport 
modes instead of in roads. The result was a very costly project, the benefits of which are 
still unclear.2 
 
 
3. The transport model and transport network 
 
The model used for our analysis is the MOLINO II model developed at the K.U. 
Leuven. The model structure allows for an economic assessment of improvements in a 
transport network with various nodes, links and paths. A full description of the model is 
outside the scope of this paper, and we restrict our discussion in this section to 
highlighting the features that are crucial for understanding and interpreting the results 
presented in the following sections.3 
                                                 
1
 In the Knight-Wendling scenario total freight transport by rail would be equal to 30 million ton by 2000. 
2
 See TCI (2004) for an extensive description of the political decision making process leading towards the 
construction of the Betuweroute. 
3
 See De Palma et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the MOLINO II model. 
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Figure 1: The transport network analysed in our case study (IWW is inland waterways). 
 
As is clear from the previous sections we focus on the impact of the Betuweroute on 
the competition between Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg for international freight 
transport. We concentrate attention on freight that arrives from over the North Sea and 
moves to the hinterland beyond the German border, in which the Ruhr area still 
occupies a central position. This international freight may use the ports of Rotterdam, 
Hamburg or Antwerp and from there use (existing) rail, road or inland waterways. The 
Betuweroute is meant as a substantial improvement in the available rail infrastructure 
and for this reason we model it as a separate mode/link. A special characteristic of the 
Betuweroute is, of course, that it is only available until the German border, which is 
therefore included as a separate ‘node’ in the part of the network that connects 
Rotterdam with its hinterland. Figure 1 presents the transport network used for our 
analyses. 
The actors in the MOLINO II model are users of this transport network. They are 
assumed to have a common structure of their utility or production functions, which can 
be described by a decision tree. One of the actors are producers that have a demand for 
international freight transport. Their production function has – at the highest level – two 
arguments: other inputs and international transport. The latter should be interpreted as a 
composite commodity, whose value is determined by the various transport types. The 
idea is that any level of production can be realised with various combinations of 
transport and other inputs and that the actual amount of transport used will depend on its 
relative price. The composite commodity ‘transport’ is determined by peak and off-peak 
transport by means of a lower-level production function. At a still lower level, the 
amounts of peak and off-peak transport are determined by the links of the network used. 
For international freight transport these links are determined by the port used 
(Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg) and the transport mode (road, rail or inland 
waterways). We treat the Betuweroute as a separate mode, which is only relevant for 
transport that passes through the port of Rotterdam. 
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Figure 2: Example of the production function with two links. 
 
The production function can be described by the nested decision tree in Figure 2. A 
producer who wants to make a certain number of units of the final product first decides 
how many units of transport and other inputs to use. In the next step, he decides how 
this total amount of transport is determined by peak and off-peak transport. Then he 
decides if the required amounts of peak and off-peak transport are to be transported by 
road, rail or inland waterways and from Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg. For 
simplicity we have assumed in that figure that only two links have to be distinguished, 
whereas in reality there are 9 or 10 (depending on the inclusion of the Betuweroute in 
the set of links). For each level of the production structure a CES-function is assumed to 
be relevant. Such a function is characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution. For 
two inputs, the CES function looks as: 
 
( )11 2x a y b y σσ σ= + , (1) 
 
where x denotes the amount of output, yi the amount of input i, a and b are scale 
coefficients, and σ  is the crucial parameter of this function because it determines the 
elasticity of substitution between the two inputs as well as the price elasticities of their 
demand. 
There are two other actors that make use of the network. There are producers with a 
demand for domestic freight transport, which results in transport flows that originate 
from one of the three ports and that have the German hinterland as their destination. 
These producers are located in the German Hinterland and their production structure is 
almost the same as that of producers with a demand for international freight 
transporters. The only difference is that the number of links is restricted to 3 or 4 (in 
case of Rotterdam with the Betuweroute as one link). Part of the network is also used 
for passenger transport. The generation of this type of transport is modeled by means of 
a utility function that is also of a nested CES type. The nesting structure is analogous to 
that for the producers, taking into account that inland waterways are not used for 
passenger transport. We abstract from international passenger transport and introduce 
four actors generating transport. The origin-destination combinations of these four 
actors are: Hamburg – German hinterland, Antwerp – German hinterland, Rotterdam – 
German border, and German border – German hinterland. 
The three actors in the model interact with each other if they use the same network 
link. This interaction is modeled through a travel time function, which gives the travel 
Production 
Transport Other inputs 
Link 2 Link 1 
Off-Peak 
Link 2 Link 1 
Peak 
Level 3 
 
 
Level 2 
 
 
Level 1  
 
 
Level 0 
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time on a particular network link as a function of the total flow of transport of the 
network. Travel time (tt) on a certain link is given by the following speed-flow relation: 
 
1
j j
j
pce q
l
tt
v c
β 
 × 
  = + α      
 
∑
, (2) 
 
where l is length of the link, v is maximum free-flow speed, pcej is passenger car 
equivalent for vehicle type j, qj is the number of vehicles of type j per hour, c is free-
flow capacity, and α and β are (exogenous) congestion function parameters. In this 
equation the total transport flow is defined as the weighted sum of the number of 
vehicles, with pcej values used as weights. For instance, for road transport a truck is 
typically counted as equivalent to three passenger cars, implying that pcej = 3 for j equal 
to trucks. 
The travel time function in equation (2) was originally developed for road transport 
and is sometimes referred to as the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) travel time function. 
In our model it is also used for rail transport and inland waterway transport. Travel time 
cost is equal to travel time as given by equation (2), multiplied by the value of time. The 
generalised prices used at each level are the sum of unit resource costs, costs of travel 
time, i.e., including internal time costs of congestion, and tolls (if present). 
The calibration of the model starts by choosing reasonable values for the elasticities 
of substitution σ  for all levels of the production or utility functions of all actors. For the 
given values of generalized travel costs, optimizing behavior then generates the 
transport flows as functions of these elasticities of substitution and the scale parameters 
of the utility and production functions, which have been denoted as a and b in equation 
(1). These parameters are determined exactly by the values of the transport flows in the 
initial situation. We run the model from 2000 to 2025. The transport related output of 
the model consists of transport flows on the various links in 2025. The output also 
contains yearly figures on net user surplus (equal to passenger transport user surplus 
minus freight transport user costs), profits of the infrastructure operators and external 
costs. These ultimately result in total welfare, implying we can compare welfare 
situations between scenarios. 
 
 
4. Modelling scenarios and model inputs 
 
Our network analysis focuses on the implications of the Betuweroute on port 
competition. Using the network in Figure 1, but without the Betuweroute, as our 
baseline network, and current pricing as our baseline pricing scheme, our modelling 
analysis first considers the implications of the new Betuweroute infrastructure. Second, 
it investigates the impact of an alternative pricing scheme, i.e., marginal social cost 
pricing plus a mark-up for costs of infrastructure maintenance and operation. This 
results in 4 four different scenarios that are summarised below: 
 
- Scenario 1 (baseline scenario): Current pricing, without Betuweroute; 
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- Scenario 2: Marginal social cost pricing plus mark-up for costs of infrastructure 
maintenance and operation, without Betuweroute; 
- Scenario 3: Current pricing, with Betuweroute; 
- Scenario 4: Marginal social cost pricing plus mark-up for costs of infrastructure 
maintenance and operation, with Betuweroute; 
 
Under marginal social cost pricing the external costs of congestion, greenhouse gas 
emissions, local pollution, noise and accidents, and costs of infrastructure maintenance 
are incorporated in the generalised prices. 
Important to note is that in our model the central government is the owner, manager 
and operator of all links, except the Betuweroute. The Betuweroute is operated and 
managed by a single separate entity. Therefore, except for the Betuweroute, all issues 
related to differences between private and public ownership, and between differences in 
organisational structures, are left out of the equation. 
Regarding inputs of the model, passenger and freight flows for specific routes are 
generally not available. This means that many assumptions are necessary. Ultimately, 
local and specific route knowledge is needed in order to calibrate the existing flows on 
the network links. In order to get some idea on the distribution of freight and passenger 
transport demand over the different links we use the ETIS database, which contains 
freight and passenger transport flows for origin-destination combinations at the NUTS 2 
level. Specifically, we derive the freight and passenger flows from Rotterdam, Antwerp 
and Hamburg to the Ruhr area, and vice versa. Of course, total transport flows are larger 
than the resulting flows, but this at least give us an idea of the distribution of 
international flows over the three links (for details see Koetse and Rouwendal, 2008). 
To get an idea on absolute figures we use data on realised rail freight flows on the 
East-West axis from Statistics Netherlands (see http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en). 
This figure turns out to be a factor 24 higher than the figure drawn from the ETIS 
database. We therefore multiply all freight flows by rail by 24. Total domestic freight 
by rail in the Netherlands over the East-West axis is 0.28 times international freight. 
Domestic freight in The Netherlands is upgraded accordingly. Total international road 
freight transport from Germany to Netherlands and the other way around is 68 mln 
tonnes. This is approximately a factor 17 higher than flows obtained from the ETIS 
database. We adjust the figures accordingly. Since data for Germany and Belgium are 
not available, we apply the same scaling factor to road freight transport from Antwerp 
and Hamburg. Total water freight transport for freight loaded in Rotterdam with 
destination Germany, Austria or Switzerland, and the other way around, is around 90 
mln tonnes. This is a factor 2.3 higher than in the ETIS database, which is used as a 
scaling factor for water transport. We make the simplifying assumption that purely 
domestic transport is zero, i.e., every tonne transported over Dutch waters is transported 
to Germany. Since data for Germany and Belgium are not available, we apply the same 
scaling factor to inland navigation transport from Antwerp and Hamburg. The different 
scaling factors for the different modes imply that the ratios between modes obtained 
from the ETIS database are lost. However, the ratios within modes, and between routes, 
remain intact. Absolute figures on passenger transport on specific routes are hard to 
come by. This is why we use the same scaling factors for passenger transport. Although 
this potentially erroneous assumption has no direct impact, it may influence the results 
through the congestion functions. Finally, in order to make a distinction between 
transport flows during peak hours and off-peak hours, we assume that 70% of freight 
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transport and 80% of passenger transport takes place during peak hours, for all modes. 
The resulting passenger and freight transport flows on the links in our network are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Initial quantities in tonnes on the various paths in the network in 2000 (Betuweroute is excluded 
because initial flows are unknown). 
  
  Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
  Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
Road 95,000 41,000 124,000 53,000 - - 
IWW - - - - - - Rotterdam-German Border 
Rail 28,000 12,000 2,000 500 - - 
Road 48,000 20,000 124,000 53,000 17,000 4,000 
IWW - - 50,000 13,000 144,000 36,000 Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Rail 14,000 6,000 7,000 1,800 28,000 7,000 
Road 16,000 6,800 257,000 64,000 49,000 12,000 
IWW - - 51,000 13,000 11,000 2,800 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 2,000 800 35,000 8,500 3,500 1,000 
Road 82,000 35,000 55,000 14,000 37,000 9,500 
IWW - - 1,700 500 500 200 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 64,000 27,000 94,000 23,000 52,000 13,000 
 
With respect to the Betuweroute there are no appraisals that contain explicit freight 
flow predictions, so an assumption is necessary here. Assuming a capacity of 680 
tonnes per train (see Table 3) and an estimated number of trains per year of 20,000 
(personal communication with Keyrail, operator of the Betuweroute), we arrive at a 
freight flow on the Betuweroute of approximately 14 million tonnes in 2008. We set 
initial quantities on the Betuweroute in 2000 such that in 2008, in the scenarios with the 
Betuweroute and given the parameter values stated below, a freight flow of 14 million 
tonnes on the Betuweroute is obtained. The maximum speed on the Betuweroute is set 
at 1km/h per hour in 2000, effectively keeping the flows on the Betuweroute at zero. In 
the scenarios with the Betuweroute we increase the maximum speed to 100 km/h in 
2008.4 Other assumptions on the Betuweroute are that tolls are 0.33 Euro per tonne per 
trip, capacity is 20 trains per hour (10 in each direction), operation and maintenance 
costs are 20% lower than those of existing rail infrastructure.5 Finally, investment in the 
Betuweroute is estimated at 4.7 billion Euro (EC, 2005). Finally, transport flows have 
increased substantially in the past, so we implement a generic yearly growth rate of 2% 
(percentage change is measured over the yearly transport flow output of the model, not 
                                                 
4
 In order to calibrate the model using identical data in all scenarios we calibrate the model with a 
maximum speed on the Betuweroute of 1 km/h. In the scenario’s with the Betuweroute we increase the 
speed to 100 km/h in 2008. We set quantities on the Betuweroute in 2000 such that in 2008, for the 
scenarios with the Betuweroute, a transport flow of 14 million tonnes is obtained. This flow is substituted 
to the Betuweroute from other links. For the scenarios without the Betuweroute maximum speed simply 
remains at 1 km/h from year 1 to 25, which effectively keeps transport flows over the Betuweroute equal 
to zero. 
5
 Keyrail expects that costs of maintenance and operation can be reduced by 20% (at a minimum) vis-à-
vis costs of current practice in rail maintenance and operation (see www.keyrail.nl). 
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over the initial figures). Within the context of the model this implies that congestion 
becomes more and more important over the years. 
Values of general, not link specific parameters are listed in Table 2. Some remarks are 
in order here. Parameters α and β are the congestion function parameters in equation (2), 
where α determines the impact of an increase in traffic flows on travel time, and β 
determines the curvature of this relationship. The latter parameter is set equal to 1.5, 
which implies that the relationship is slightly non-linear. The parameter α  is set equal 
to 0.2. This implies that for a trip of an hour under free-flow conditions and a q/c ratio 
of 2, i.e., the number of vehicles is twice as large as the capacity, there is a delay of 
around 9 minutes. This appears to be reasonably in line with actual experience. Further, 
the passenger car equivalent (PCE) of a truck is set at 3 according to European 
standards, i.e., a truck is assumed to take up 3 times as much space as a car on the road. 
In the marginal social cost pricing scenario’s it therefore gets assigned a larger part of 
the external costs of congestion. Transport share is set at 0.05, which means that 5% of 
all consumption is spent on transport. 
Table 2: General (not link-specific) parameters. 
Parameter Value 
α  0.2 
β  1.5 
PCE truck 3 
Transport Share 0.05 
Elasticity periods passenger 0.2 
Elasticity periods freight 0.2 
Elasticity transport passenger 0.8 
Elasticity transport freight 0.8 
Elasticity paths passenger 1.5 
Elasticity paths freight 1.5 
Life Time infrastructure 35 years 
Interest 4% 
 
Important for the results of the model are the various substitution elasticities. 
Substitution elasticities between periods and between transport and other consumption 
are set equal to 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The main consequence of this assumption is 
that time loss due to congestion leads to relatively small shifts from peak to off-peak 
transport flows, which of course also depends on the amount of congestion and the 
share of congestion costs in total resource costs. Substitution between paths for freight 
transport is assumed to be elastic; the elasticity is set at 3. Finally, the life time of the 
Betuweroute is set at 35 years and the discount rate is equal to 4%. 
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Table 3: Link-specific inputs (units of measurement are given below the table). 
Variable  Rotterdam – German 
Border 
German Border – 
Ruhr Antwerp – Ruhr Hamburg – Ruhr 
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Duration 
 8 12 8 12 8 12 8 8 12 8 8 12 8 
Length 
 160 160 160 160 95 95 95 225 225 225 355 355 355 
Capacity 
 8,800 20 12 20 8,800 20 12 8,800 20 12 8,800 20 12 
Maximum 
Speed 
 68 60 8 100 68 60 8 68 60 8 68 60 8 
Occupancy Passenger 
peak 1.2 500 - - 1.2 500 - 1.2 500 - 1.2 500 - 
 Passenger 
off-peak 1 200 - - 1 200 - 1 200 - 1 200 - 
 Freight 
peak 15 680 1,900 680 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 
 Freight 
off-peak 15 680 1,900 680 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 
Resource 
costs 
Passenger 0.54 12 - 12 0.89 12 - 0.89 12 - 0.89 12 - 
 Freight 0.89 12 45.00 12 0.89 12 45.00 0.89 12 45.00 0.89 12 45 
Variable MC Passenger 0.51 386 - - 0.3 230 - 0.71 543 - 1.12 857 - 
 Freight 19.3 706 84 706 11.5 419 50 27.1 992 119 42.8 1565 187 
Fixed OPC 
 7,600 57,000 41,000 45,600 4,500 34,000 24,000 10500 80000 57000 17,000 125,000 90,000 
VOT Passenger 
peak 6.7 6.7 - - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 
 Passenger 
off-peak 6.7 6.7 - - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 
 Freight 
peak 2.9 0.76 0.18 0.76 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 
 Freight 
off-peak 2.9 0.76 0.18 0.76 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 
External Costs Passenger 
peak 0.033 0.969 - - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 
 
Passenger 
off-peak 0.033 0.969 - - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 
 
Freight 
peak 0.175 1.381 1.204 1.381 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 
 
Freight 
off-peak 0.175 1.381 1.204 1.381 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 
Notes: 
Variable Unit of measurement 
Duration Number of peak hours per day 
Length Length of the links in kilometres 
Capacity Free-flow capacity per hour 
Maximum speed Kilometres per hour 
Occupancy Occupancy rates in passengers or tons per vehicle 
Resource costs Resource costs of vehicle use in Euro per vehicle kilometre 
Variable MC Variable infrastructure maintenance costs in Euro per passenger or freight vehicle  
Fixed OPC Fixed infrastructure operation costs in Euro per day 
Value of time Value of time in Euro per hour per passenger or tonne 
External costs Euro per vehicle kilometre (external costs of congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, 
local pollution, noise and accidents). 
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Values for link-specific parameters and variables are summarised in Table 3. Note 
that most figures differ per mode but not per country. For example, road data for The 
Netherlands are transferred to Belgium and Germany. The reason is that we could not 
obtain specific data for Belgium and Germany.6 When figures differ per country this is 
because of differences in length of the various links. For example, fixed operation costs 
are based on operation costs per km infrastructure in The Netherlands. Because the links 
differ in length, operation costs also differ by link. The same holds for variable 
maintenance costs. Values for maximum speeds and number of peak hours per day are 
based on assumptions, while length of the various links are based on own calculations. 
Occupancy rates for road passenger transport are based on (informed) assumptions, 
while occupancy rates for rail passenger transport is based on information contained in 
NS and Prorail (2006). Data on occupancy rates for freight transport, measured in 
tonnes per vehicle, are from a detailed freight transport database in The Netherlands 
(see NEA et al., 2005). Resource costs for the three modes, consisting of depreciation 
costs, interest costs, insurance costs, labour costs and other direct transport related costs, 
are obtained from the same source. 
Further, free-flow infrastructure capacities for IWW and rail transport are based on 
own assumptions, while road infrastructure capacity is based on an assumption of 2 
lanes per direction and 2,200 vehicles per lane per hour (see Smith et al., 1996). Values 
of time are important inputs for calculating costs of congestion. We use those that were 
used in the UNITE project (see Nellthorp et al., 2001). Finally, variable maintenance 
costs, fixed operation costs and external costs are derived from own calculations based 
on CE/VU (2004) and Statistics Netherlands (see http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en). 
Of course, the results presented in the following section depend to a certain extent to 
the values for the parameters and variables discussed above. Especially important are 
the uncertainty around initial passenger and freight transport flows, the absolute and 
relative magnitudes of the various costs figures, and the assumption on the substitution 
elasticity between paths. Sensitivity analyses should provide insight into the sensitivity 
of the results to changes in these values. 
 
 
5. Simulation results 
 
5.1. Welfare consequences 
 
In Table 4 we present the results of welfare computations in four scenarios. Scenario 
1 is a base case without the Betuweroute. Scenario 2 refers to the introduction of 
marginal social cost (MSC) pricing in the base case. Scenario 3 is the base case with the 
Betuweroute but without MSC pricing. Finally, case 4 refers to the situation in which 
both MSC pricing and the Betuweroute are introduced. The consequences of MSC 
pricing are according to expectation; net user surplus decreases because of lower 
transport demand and higher generalised transport prices, toll revenues increase, and 
                                                 
6
 Although this may influence the results somewhat, it is not likely that figures for Belgium and Germany 
are very different from those for The Netherlands. Especially the values of time and the external costs of 
transport may differ slightly among these countries, but not to an extent that results would change in a 
qualitative sense. 
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external costs drop by a large amount. Comparison of the total welfare in both scenarios 
shows that the net effect of these developments is a substantial increase in total welfare. 
Construction of the Betuweroute induces a shift from road to rail transport (see next 
section), and total transport on the network increases slightly. Although external costs 
per tonne kilometre are lower for rail than for road transport, the net effect of these 
developments is a slight increase in total external costs. Ultimately, in accordance with 
earlier Betuweroute assessments, the construction and operation of the Betuweroute is 
not profitable for the operator and also causes a substantial drop in total welfare. This 
result is reached when the Betuweroute is introduced in the base case, but also when it 
is introduced in a situation with MSC pricing. Not surprisingly, the main reason for this 
result is the large infrastructure investment costs associated with the Betuweroute. 
Table 4: Welfare effects in the four scenarios in millions of Euro per year (figures are discounted sums in 
2000 using a 4% discount rate). 
 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Passenger transport users' surplus (1)     
Total 8,987,390 8,933,051 8,987,463 8,933,145 
Freight transport users' costs (2)     
Local 3,769,810 3,822,600 3,769,311 3,822,033 
Transit 1,245,791 1,261,208 1,244,336 1,259,680 
Net user surplus (3) = (1) – (2)     
Total 3,971,788 3,849,244 3,973,816 3,851,432 
Toll revenues (4)     
Central government – 130.4 – 130.1 
Betuwe  – 53.3 171.9 
Infrastructure costs     
Investment Betuwe (5) – – 3,434 3,434 
Salvage value Betuwe (6) – – 483 483 
Operation and maintenance costs (7) 
    
Operation costs central 23,784 20,063 23,807 20,089 
Operation costs Betuwe – – 294 278 
Profits operator (8) = (4) – (7) – (5) + (6)  
    
Central –23,784 110,382 –23,807 109,999 
Betuwe – – –3,192 –3,057 
External costs (9)     
Total 35,595 30,499 35,601 30,512 
Total welfare (10) = (3) + (8) – (9)     
Total 3,912,408 3,929,128 3,911,216 3,927,862 
 
5.2. Changes in transport flows 
 
Note that there is an autonomous growth in transport flows of 2% per year and that 
flows may furthermore change due to differences in congestion on the various links. 
This implies that total transport in 2025 can be maximally 64% percent higher than that 
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in 2000 (1.0225 = 1.64), but that transport on a specific link may show a larger increase 
because of differences in congestion and associated substitution of flows between 
routes. 
 
Scenario 1 
 
In Table 5 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 1, with 
initial transport flows in 2000 set equal to 1. Compared to 2000 the local and transit 
freight flows on the entire network in 2025 have grown by approximately 53% (not in 
table). Compared to a maximum growth of 64% we may therefore conclude that 
congestion substantially reduces freight transport flows. Furthermore, especially rail 
transport in the Netherlands and Belgium increase substantially, both in a relative and 
an absolute sense. Apparently congestion on roads and water in these countries lead to 
substitution towards rail. 
Table 5: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 1 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1). 
  
 
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 1.55 1.49 1.45 
IWW – 1.36 1.45 
Rail 1.58 1.76 1.69 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – – – 
Road 1.61 1.56 1.60 
IWW – 1.53 1.57 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 1.63 1.69 1.73 
Road 1.62 1.54 1.55 
IWW – 1.59 1.60 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 1.40 1.54 1.55 
 
When looking more specifically at total freight flows to and from the three ports (see 
Table 6), we see a striking reduction in the competitive position of Rotterdam. This is 
especially true for transit freight, which partly switches to the ports of Antwerp and 
Hamburg. Apparently, congestion on the links from Rotterdam to the Ruhr area, and 
vice versa, become problematic in the future. 
Table 6: Total quantities from or to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025 for Scenario 1 (input 
Scenario 1 in 2000 = 1). 
 Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Rotterdam 1.56 1.48 1.49 
Antwerp 1.61 1.57 1.60 
Hamburg 1.52 1.54 1.55 
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Scenario 2 
 
In Table 7 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 2 
compared to the output in 2025 for Scenario 1. Compared to 2000 the freight flows on 
the entire network in 2025 have increased by approximately 24% (not in table). When 
we compare this figure to the growth figures in scenario 1, marginal social cost pricing 
apparently causes a large reduction in transport flows. There furthermore is a striking 
shift from road and rail to waterway transport, likely because of the relatively limited 
maintenance costs for waterways. Furthermore, although total freight flows have 
decreased, the competitive positions of the three ports are similar to those in scenario 1 
(not in Table). This is not entirely surprising since we have made almost no distinction 
in external costs between The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Only external costs 
of congestion are different between the three regions, but they apparently do not make a 
substantial contribution to total external costs per kilometer. 
Table 7: Transport flows going to and from the three ports in 2025 for Scenario 2 (output Scenario 1 in 
2025 = 1). 
 
 
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 0.88 0.78 0.75 
IWW – 0.82 0.87 
Rail 0.89 0.84 0.80 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – – – 
Road 0.93 0.82 0.83 
IWW - 0.96 0.97 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 0.94 0.81 0.82 
Road 0.93 0.80 0.78 
IWW – 1.03 1.00 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 0.78 0.78 0.76 
 
Scenario 3 
 
In Table 8 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 3. For 
Scenario 3 the freight flows in 2025 have increased by approximately 55% compared to 
2000 (not in table). Compared to an total increase of 52% in scenario 1 the additional 
freight link therefore has a slight positive effect on total freight transport. This is also 
expressed in the increase in transport flows along the Betuweroute (which is below the 
increase on other links because the reference year is 2008 instead of 2000). 
The consequences of the Betuweroute for the port of Rotterdam in 2025 are large (see 
Table 9). The competitive position of Rotterdam now improves vis-à-vis Antwerp and 
Hamburg. However, this change in competitive position is a direct consequence of two 
central assumptions, i.e., our assumption that freight flows on the Betuweroute in 2008 
resemble the transport flow estimates made by the Betuweroute operator, and our 
assumption that the distribution of freight to local and transit freight on the Betuweroute 
is identical to the distribution of freight flows on the existing rail link in 2000. In this 
view, the change in competitive position is there by construction, and may not be seen 
as pure output of the model. 
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Table 8: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 3 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1*). 
  
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 1.55 1.48 1.30 
IWW – 1.36 1.12 
Rail 1.57 1.73 1.21 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – 1.49 1.45 
Road 1.61 1.56 1.56 
IWW – 1.53 1.53 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 1.63 1.69 1.68 
Road 1.62 1.54 1.51 
IWW – 1.59 1.56 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 1.40 1.54 1.51 
Note: * For the Betuweroute the quantities in 2008 are set at 1. 
 
For local freight the figures for Antwerp and Hamburg are identical to those in 
scenario 1, which makes sense since nothing has changed there locally. For Rotterdam, 
local freight has increased slightly vis-à-vis scenario 1 because of the Betuweroute. 
Transit freight has also increased for Rotterdam, which is for a large part due to a shift 
back from Antwerp and Hamburg. This shift cannot be observed from the tables 
directly. However, observe that if transit freight has increased on the entire network, 
then the decrease in Antwerp and Hamburg must have been more than offset by an 
increase in Rotterdam. 
Table 9: Total quantities from or to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025 for Scenario 3 (input 
Scenario 1 in 2000 = 1). 
 Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Rotterdam 1.56 1.50 1.63 
Antwerp 1.62 1.57 1.56 
Hamburg 1.52 1.54 1.51 
 
Scenario 4 
 
In Table 10 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 4. 
Compared to 2000 freight flows on the entire network in 2025 have grown by 
approximately 27% (not in table). The freight figures are lower than under current 
pricing (scenario 1 and 3) but higher than in the scenario with marginal social cost 
pricing and without the Betuweroute (scenario 2). Again we see a substitution of freight 
transport from road and rail to water. Note that the figures (except those for the 
Betuweroute) are almost identical to those under scenario 2. This implies that marginal 
social cost pricing in the situation with the Betuweroute has no additional effect on the 
competitive position of Rotterdam versus Antwerp and Hamburg. 
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Table 10: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 4 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1*). 
  
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 0.88 0.78 0.75 
IWW – 0.82 0.88 
Rail 0.89 0.83 0.79 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – 0.91 0.87 
Road 0.93 0.82 0.83 
IWW – 0.96 0.97 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 0.94 0.81 0.82 
Road 0.93 0.80 0.78 
IWW – 1.03 1.00 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 0.78 0.78 0.76 
Note: * For the Betuweroute the quantities in 2008 are set at 1. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
The construction of the Betuweroute has been a heavily debated issue in The 
Netherlands. Even at the moment strong doubts exist with respect to its profitability and 
its potential to attract transport from other transport routes. In this paper we use a 
transport model to analyse some of the potential consequences of construction and 
operation of the Betuweroute. The network includes transport from Rotterdam, Antwerp 
and Hamburg to the Ruhr area, and vice versa. Net growth of demand for transport on 
each link is assumed to be equal to 2% per year, which ensures that congestion in the 
network increases substantially over time. We run the model from 2000 to 2025 and 
analyse transport flows and welfare effects using a specific transport network under four 
scenarios, i.e., with and without the Betuweroute, and under current pricing and 
marginal social cost pricing. Our main findings are as follows. 
Under current prices and without the Betuweroute, freight flows on the entire network 
increase with approximately 53% in 2025 vis-à-vis 2000. Without congestion, flows 
would increase by 64%, which shows that congestion substantially reduces transport 
flows. We also see a striking reduction in the competitive position of the port of 
Rotterdam. This is especially true for transit freight, which partly switches to the ports 
of Antwerp and Hamburg. Especially the congestion on the links from Rotterdam to the 
Ruhr area appear to become problematic in the future. When marginal social cost 
pricing is introduced, thereby increasing the price of transport, freight transport on the 
entire network in 2025 is reduced even further, and the competitive position of 
Rotterdam does not improve. In the scenarios with the Betuweroute, freight on the 
entire network increases vis-à-vis the scenarios without the Betuweroute. This increase 
in generic freight transport is also expressed in substantial transport flows on the 
Betuweroute itself. Also striking are the consequences of the Betuweroute for the port 
of Rotterdam in 2025, the competitive position of which has now increased vis-à-vis 
Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025. 
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The welfare consequences of introducing marginal social costs pricing are according 
to expectation; net user surplus decreases because transport demand decreases and 
generalised transport prices increase, toll revenues increase, and external costs drop 
substantially. The result is a substantial increase in total welfare. However, the welfare 
consequences of the Betuweroute are negative. Although unit toll is higher than unit 
variable costs of operation and maintenance, toll revenues are not nearly enough to 
cover total costs of operation and maintenance. Together with the substantial investment 
costs this leads to a negative profit and a substantial drop in social welfare. This 
analysis therefore shows that, although the Betuweroute may certainly be beneficial to 
the competitive position of the port of Rotterdam, investment costs of the Betuweroute 
are too large for the investment to be sensible from a welfare perspective. Admittedly 
this result is partly based on earlier assumptions regarding future transport on the 
Betuweroute, but since these assumptions are likely biased upwards, the results should 
not be expected to become more favourable for the Betuweroute if more accurate actual 
transport flows would be used. It is therefore clear that ex ante assessments of the 
Betuweroute, if a sensible transport model and network had been used, could already 
have shown the economic consequences of the Betuwe investment. Whatever the actual 
outcome of the investment decision in the political arena would have been, had such an 
analysis been available at that stage, at least it would have been based on more objective 
and rational information. 
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Abstract 
 
The influence of land use on daily mobility patterns can be described by the two dimensions of urban 
form: the first is quantitative, that is density, and the second is qualitative, that is land use mix. Empirical 
studies usually add control variables such as sociodemographic characteristics. They suppose that urban 
form factors and sociodemographic factors have a separate influence on travel patterns. 
In this paper, we first show the possibility of a causal relationship between urban form and 
sociodemographic characteristics. Thus previous results, which suppose that these two kinds of factors are 
separated, may be biased. It describes systematic relationships between urban form, socio-demographic 
characteristics, and daily mobility. As a consequence, we have to use specific econometric methods to test 
the motives of mobility. We develop a new tool: the “typological regressions”. Travel patterns in the 
metropolitan area of Bordeaux are then analyzed. Results allow to disentangle the interaction between 
land use pattenrs and travel behaviours. 
 
Keywords: Compact city; Urban density; Urban form; Mobility; Land use patterns. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sustainable development constitutes a normative framework for thinking as much as 
for action (Hart, 2002), which sets the necessity for a control of the negative 
externalities of economic growth. As such, the question of daily travel proves to be 
crucial. The objective of “sustainable mobility” consists in protecting both environment 
and health without decreasing the need for travel1. As cities stand as a pertinent scale for 
the application of sustainable policies (Camagni et al., 1998), reaching the goal of 
                                                 
* Corresponding authors: G. Pouyanne (pouyanne@u-bordeaux4.fr) 
1
 This formulation stems from a french national law, the LAURE of 1996, an equivalent of the american 
Clean Air Act. 
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sustainable mobility supposes that the share of the automobile in urban daily travels is 
reduced. 
Beyond measures intending to reduce emissions or traffic, like car-sharing or 
incentives to use “soft” travel modes (walking or transit), an overall thought emerges, 
based on the interaction between urban form and travel patterns (Pouyanne, 2005). In 
the French city of Bordeaux, the P.D.U.2 seeks to “act on the evolution of the urban 
morphology [to] limit automobile use and its foreseeable growth” (Cub, 2001: 31). The 
main goal is to control for urban sprawl, as it is supposed an interaction between 
automobile use and low-density settlement patterns. 
 
- On one’s hand, automobile use has allowed to push back the boundaries of the 
city. The so-called Zahavi Law, which enounces that travel times are constant 
over time (Zahavi and Ryan, 1980; Gordon, Richardson and Jun, 1991; Levinson 
and Kumar, 1997), can be interpreted as follow: speed gains linked to automobile 
use were traded against an increase of the amount of liveable space through a 
more peripheric location (Dupuy, 1999; Gordon and Richardson, 1997). An 
Automobile City is shaped, which not only extends the urbanized area, but also 
fills in the empty spaces produced by the «fingerglove» structure of the Transit 
City (Newman and Kenworthy, 1998). 
- On the other hand, the dispersed and low density urban form, which is a 
characteristic of sprawl, creates low levels of accessibility, and thus favours 
automobile use. Some authors talk about automobile dependence, stating that “use 
of an automobile became not so much a choice but a necessity in the Auto City” 
(Newman and Kenworthy, 1998: 31). 
 
Thus automobile use has increased sprawl, as much as sprawl has expanded 
automobile use. That is why urban planification is oriented towards a control of urban 
sprawl, by means of bringing up to date urban revitalization (Breheny, 1995), or 
adopting “urban growth boundaries” measures (Dawkins and Nelson, 2002). The 
underlying model is the one of the “Compact City”. 
The model of the Compact City is first based on empirical results. The well-known 
Newman and Kenworthy’s curve sets up, for thirty-two global cities, an inverse 
relationship between gasoline consumption per capita and net urban density (Newman 
and Kenworthy, 1989). Numerous studies confirm such a relationship, at an inter-urban 
scale (Naess, 1996; Cameron et al., 2003; Giuliano and Narayan, 2003; Cirilli and 
Veneri, 2008) as much as at an intra-urban scale (e.g. Fouchier, 1997; Cervero and 
Kockelman, 1997; Frank and Pivo, 1994). 
Second, these converging results can be justified on a theoretical basis. Indeed, high 
densities allow: 
 
- To improve overall accessibility. All other things being equal, more destinations 
are available at a given distance, which means shorter trip lengths (Fouchier, 
1997). As a consequence, modal split is facilitated (Burton, 2000); 
- An increase in congestion levels. What could be a drawback of density may be in 
fact an advantage: congestion decreases the comparative duration advantage of the 
                                                 
2
 Plan des Déplacements Urbains, a forecast planning document which focuses on the 5-years evolution 
of individual mobility and tries to plan it. 
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car in the denser parts of the city, and so incitates to the use of “soft” travel 
modes3; 
- To increase the use of transit (Emangard, 1994; Iglesias, 2007), and to improve 
their economic efficiency (Kenworthy and Laube, 1999). 
 
Nevertheless, the comparative advantages of the Compact City have been discussed 
(Pouyanne, 2004a: 9)4, sometimes vehemently. Densification measures are seen as 
“undesirable” (Breheny, 1997), as they go against the desire of a detached home 
(Gordon and Richardson, 1997), and because of the risks of crowding (Knight, 1996). 
Furthermore, a contradiction of the Compact City is due to the fact that people who 
pollute more are the ones which suffer less from emissions (Nicolas et al., 2001). At 
last, the raise in land values due to densification measures leads to the fear of a 
“compact city within a doughnut of decay” (Smyth, 1996). 
The controversy about drawbacks and advantages of high densities is an old one (e.g. 
Le Corbusier, 1933), and it seems that there cannot be any consensus. Consequently, we 
may be led to consider not only density, but other dimensions of urban form. What is 
interesting is not only the intensity in land use, but, more generally, the way a parcel of 
land is used. Thus, the underlying issue is the interaction between land use and travel 
patterns. An intra-urban analysis is needed, to characterize more precisely the urban 
form, among others by taking in account land use mix. 
In this paper we want to understand the relationships between land use and travel 
patterns, through the proposition of a specific statistical method and an application to 
the metropolitan area of Bordeaux (France). We first describe previous results of the 
research as far as the land use-travel patterns interaction is concerned. Then, we point 
out some methodological problems, which lead us to build up our own method of 
analysis. This method implies the adoption of adapted econometric techniques, which 
will be tested in the case of the metropolitan area of Bordeaux. 
 
 
2. The land use – travel pattern interaction: previous results 
 
The issue of the interaction between land use and daily mobility has been of growing 
interest among researchers. R. Ewing and R. Cervero (2001) list more than fifty 
empirical studies on that subject during the 1990’s. Mobility variables usually 
considered are: trip length, number of trips, modal shares and the number of kilometres 
travelled per capita, which is a rough estimation of gasoline consumption per capita. 
Urban form is usually measured through the “3D’s”: Density, Diversity (of land use), 
and Design (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997), that is both quantitative (density) and 
qualitative (land use diversity and urban design) dimensions. 
 
2.1. Density 
 
The influence of density on travel patterns is now well-known. We have noticed 
above how convergent the results are, at an inter-urban scale as much as at an intra-
                                                 
3
 Such a reasoning is based on the converse of the well-known Mogridge Conjecture (Mogridge, 1980). 
4
 The controversy around the Compact City model is also related in the book of M. Jenks et al. (1996). 
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urban scale. The Newman and Kenworthy (1989)’s curve has been verified: residential 
density and employment density have a negative influence on vehicle-miles travelled 
(e.g. Frank and Pivo, 1994; Frank et al., 2000; Krizek, 2003; Cameron et al., 2003), 
which can be explained by shorter trip lengths and a modal shift towards “soft” travel 
modes (Meunié and Pouyanne, 2007; Cirilli and Veneri, 2008)5. 
 
2.2. Diversity of land use 
 
The practice of zoning raises trip length by generating “tunnel effects » (OCDE, 
1994). A contrario, diversity of land use is supposed to bring the origin and the 
destination of the trip closer. What is meant by diversity is the functional variety of land 
use. Differences in measuring diversity come from divergences in the functions taken in 
account by the authors. 
The simplest measure of diversity is given by R. Camagni et al. (2002) in their study 
on the metropolitan area of Milan (Italy). Two functions are considered: to live and to 
work. Then land use mix is the jobs-housing ratio. The jobs-housing balance influences 
negatively the ecological impact of mobility6, which indicates “a growing impact with 
[…] an increase of the residential content of a zone” (Camagni et al., 2002: 126). 
Travel behaviours may not be the same according to the purpose of the trip: home-
work trips are usually distinguished from commercial or leisure trips. As a consequence, 
some studies make a difference between retail and others jobs; then, the measure of 
diversity is based on the sectoral distribution of jobs. For example, D. Chatman (2003) 
tries to explain mileage traveled for commercial purpose by the proportion of retail jobs 
in the area, but he does not find any significant relationship. M. G. Boarnett and S. 
Sarmiento (1998) make a joint test of retail jobs density and service jobs density to 
explain non-work trips. They don’t obtain any significant result. G. Pouyanne (2006) 
makes a joint test of functional and economic diversity, and finds they both have an 
effect on mobility patterns. 
An entropy index can be used to measure the diversity of land uses. L. D. Frank and 
G. Pivo (1994) show that the more specialized an area is, the less people walk to their 
job. R. Cervero and K. Kockelman (1997) use a “dissimilarity index”: for each spatial 
unit, it measures the proportion of adjacent unit whose use is different. With an 
elasticity of 0.11, the dissimilarity index is positively associated with the car-sharing 
rate. 
For a same density, some “trip generators” can produce more travel because of a 
specificity in land use. In San Francisco, R. Cervero and K.-L. Wu (1998) note that the 
biggest increase of VMT occured in the most remote and the most rapidly growing 
subcenters. Thus we’re led to consider not only the local accessibility of a zone, but also 
the regional accessibility. K. Krizek (2003) shows that the regional accessibility index is 
negatively associated with the variation of total VMT, individudal VMT, and tours. For 
J. Rajamani et al. (2003), regional accessibility increases the number of leisure trips. 
 
                                                 
5
 In cities that are still characterized by a monocentric structure, this relation may widely be due to the 
influence of the distance to the center: some studies on french middle-sized cities show that trip length 
and automobile use raise significantly with the distance to the CBD (e.g. Hivert, 1998). 
6
 Measured through a synthetic index of the environmental impact of travel on the environment. 
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2.3. Design 
 
Some authors have pointed out the influence of urban design on travel patterns. For 
example, M. Boarnett and R. Crane (2001) show that a grid-shaped street pattern raises 
the modal share of the automobile for non-work trips. At the contrary, the number of 
culs-de-sac is inversely correlated to walking (Rajamani et al., 2003). Some other urban 
design characteristics, such as parking disponibility (Naess and Sandberg, 1996) or the 
density of bicycle paths (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997), also influence travel patterns. 
Studies presented here bring a comprehensive view of the urban form – travel patterns 
interaction. However, some methodological issues related to this question must be 
stressed. They constitute a basis to formulate an original statistical method. 
 
 
3. The urban form – travel patterns interaction: methodological issues 
 
The necessity to take in account the sociodemographic individual characteristics in 
the study of the urban form-travel patterns interaction raises a problem of causality 
between explicative variables. Then the usual conceptual framework, which establishes 
a strict distinction between the two types of factors of urban daily mobility, must be 
complemented: we propose our own theoretical framework, the “triangular 
relationship”. 
 
3.1. Taking in account sociodemographic individual characteristics 
 
Individuals’ sociodemographic characteristics influence travel behaviour. Income, for 
example, has an effect on automobile possession and use (Jullien, 2002). Level of 
education, age, household size, etc. set up a “lifestyle” which determines specific travel 
behaviours (Kaufmann et al., 2001). 
In the analysis of the urban form-travel pattern interactions, it is necesary to take the 
influence of sociodemographic characteristics in account. The underlying conceptual 
framework is the L. S. Frank and G. Pivo (1994)’s one: they suppose a strict distinction 
between urban form factors and non urban form factors - such as individuals’ 
characteristics (cf. Figure 1). Technically, the last are labelled “control variables”, and 
they are simply added to the model. Studies sometimes distinguish a base model (with 
only urban form variables) and a full model (e.g. Boarnett and Crane, 2001; Boarnett 
and Sarmiento, 1998; Rajamani et al., 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual framework for the analysis of the factors of daily mobility. 
Source: Frank and Pivo, 1994. 
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This method puts forward non-urban form factors of daily mobility, such as: income 
(with a possible quadratic effect – Boarnett and Crane, 2001; Rajamani et al., 2003); 
household size (positively associated with the number of tours – Krizek, 2003); the level 
of education (in Netherlands, the highest level of education is, the lowest automobile 
use is – Dieleman et al., 2002); gender (Boarnett and Sarmiento, 1998), etc. As a 
consequence, the integration of sociodemographic characteristics in the analysis is 
essential. Nevertheless, we’re faced with two types of methodological problems: 
multicollinearity and causality. 
 
3.2. The problem of multicollinearity 
 
In a technical point of view, most of the empirical studies on the urban form-travel 
patterns interactions reviewed here are based on cross-sections data. This kind of data 
often produces multicollinearity problems. For example, urban density may include 
numerous distinct influences: “Density has often been used to proxy a large number of 
excluded urban form variables” (Rajamani et al., 2003). Inside each group of factors, 
some correlations between variables may stand out, which produce a bias in the results: 
in case of multicollinearity, the OLS estimator is inefficient (Greene, 2000, 6.7). If some 
variables are strongly correlated in the model, results may be difficult to interpret: 
according to R. Cervero and K. Kockelman (1997: 203): “it is questionable whether 
many built environment variables will show up as statistically significant. This is partly 
because of the colinearity between factors like neighbourhood densities, mixed use 
levels and pedestrian amenities”. 
It raises the problem of a pertinent use of urban density as an explicative variable. 
How to interpret the influence of urban density on mobility variables? Is there an effect 
“hidden” by density? R. Cervero and R. Ewing (2001: 100) summarize this dilemma in 
the following terms: “an unresolved issue is whether the impact of density on travel 
patterns is due to density itself or other variables with which density covaries (central 
location, good transit service, etc.). [S.] Handy puts this issue this way: ‘many studies 
focus on density, but is it density that matters? No, probably not. Probably what matters 
is what goes along with density’”. As a consequence, it becomes necesary to explain 
density to understand “what goes along” with it: “the explanation for density is itself an 
important yet often neglected part of the story” (Boarnett and Crane, 2001: 825). Some 
previous work by the author was based on such an approach (Pouyanne, 2004b). 
Technically, the multicollinearity can be overcome by testing several small models. 
However, another problem remains: the fact that urban form factors and non urban form 
factors can interact by means of causal links. 
 
3.3. The problem of causality 
 
The Gary and Pivo’s conceptual framework (cf. Figure 1) supposes that the non-urban 
form factors and the urban form factors are separated: they have a distinct influence on 
travel patterns. However, we may suppose an interaction between these two kinds of 
factors. As a consequence, it seems difficult to isolate the respective influence of each 
one. According to R. Dunphy and K. Fischer, “the patterns [of higher levels of transit 
use and lower automobile travel in higher density communities] is not as clear cut 
because of the intervening relationship between density and the demographic 
characteristics of certain households” (cited in Boarnett and Crane, 2001: 824-825). 
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Some causal links between variables may stand out between the two groups of factors 
of mobility. We would be faced with complex relationships between travel behaviours 
and sociodemographic and land use characteristics, which produce logical uncertainty. 
Usual quantitative techniques don’t allow to bring out clear causal relationships. We 
share the S. Handy’s statement, for whom studies on the urban form-travel patterns 
interaction “reveal correlations between the built environment and travel behaviour but 
do not prove causality” (Handy, 2002: 15). 
In the literature, the problem of the interactions between sociodemographic variables 
and urban form characteristics is only mentioned, without any attempt to overcome it. 
Yet it is essential to ensure the robustness of the results. The transfer from an 
empirically noticed correlation to a causal relationship must be made cautiously, as 
there could be a tierce factor intervening between the two terms of the correlation. 
That’s why the possibility of a causal link between urban form and sociodemographic 
characteristics is so important in studying the factors of daily mobility. 
The Figure 2 shows the possibility of statistically significant noticed correlations 
between variables (bold type arrows) that could be explained by different causal 
relationships (normal type arrows). The link between individuals’ characteristics and 
urban form can be either a direct or an indirect relationship, that may allow us to 
complement the Gary and Pivo’s scheme (cf. Figure 1).  
We illustrate these two kinds of causality thanks to the example of Bordeaux, a 
801,309 inhabitants French metropolitan area. Data we use here is from the HTS 
(Household Travel Study) of 1998. This study has been conducted on 4,239 households. 
The study area was divided in 66 zones of different size, for which we had mobility 
data, sociodemographic data and land use data. 
 
Figure 2: Direct causality (on the left) and indirect causality (on the right) between sociodemographic 
characteristics and urban form. 
 
3.4. Direct causal links between sociodemographic characteristics and urban form 
 
Individuals’ characteristics can determine the location in a specific environment. A 
direct causal relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and urban form can 
be described in the following way: (1) individuals’ characteristics determine their 
location in a particular urban form; afterwards, (2) such a location determine their travel 
behaviour, by virtue of the link between urban form and daily mobility. 
The strong correlation between familial composition and travel behaviour seems to be 
of particular interest to illustrate the direct relationship between sociodemographic 
characteristics and urban form. Previous studies underline the influence of the number 
of children on modal shares (Rajamani et al., 2003), the influence of age on individual 
gasoline consumption (van Diepen and Voogd, 2001), the influence of number of 
employed people per household on modal shares (Dieleman et al., 2002), etc. 
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The noticed correlation between household size and travel patterns is usually 
interpreted this way: an increase in the number of children brings about an increase in 
the household’s mobility needs, possibly in the number of tours, an incentive to 
automobile use. Without denying the strong power of explanation of such an 
interpretation, we must put it into context: we can suppose that household size causes a 
location in a specific urban form, which in turns influences daily mobility patterns. 
In the case of Bordeaux, we can notice that larger households are much more 
numerous in the peripheral, low density parts of the urban area. Inversely, the household 
size is smaller in the central, high density parts of the city. As a consequence, we can 
suppose a “location effect” on households’ travel behaviours. The Figure 3 shows a 
positive correlation between household size and the number of cars per household, and 
how sensitive to the values of human density7 this relationship is. 
This “location effect” can be explained through two possible ways: 
 
- An amenity-based interpretation. An increase in the household size may provoke 
a “flight from the center” behaviour, to protect one’s children from negative 
externalities traditionally associated with the CBD (pollution, lack of security, 
etc.) or to benefit from the positive amenities of the périphery8. More generally, 
an increase of the age of the head of the household, which usually corresponds to 
an increase in income, may correspond to a peripheral location9. 
- A real estate availability explanation. Small flats appear to be more prevalent in 
central, high-density zones, while large-size homes (such as detached ones) are 
much more numerous in peripheral, low-density ones. Thus, small-size 
households will locate in the first ones, as large-size households will settle in 
second ones10. 
 
Thus the correlation between household size and mobility can either be a direct causal 
link, or an indirect one. In this last hypothesis, such a correlation comes from location 
behaviour of the household. We’re faced with a logical uncertainty, which means the 
impossibility to separate the cause and the effect: we can’t settle the “visible” causal 
link and the “hidden” one. We’re just able to notice a complex relationship between 
mobility variables and sociodemographic or urban form variables. 
                                                 
7
 Human density is the sum of residential density and employment density. It is used here, because it 
provides a good measure of the intensity of urban land use by human activities (Fouchier, 1997). 
8
 For this last type of explanation, we refer the reader to the « flight from blight hypothesis » literature 
(e.g. Carlino & Mills, 1987; Mills and Price, 1984).  
9
 Such an explanation supposes a specific structure of preference, which highlights detached houses in 
peripheral location. This hypothesis is usually of good help to explain american suburbanization (Mills & 
Lubuele, 1997), even if some studies try to go against this statement (Schlay, 1986). This structure of 
preference is less obvious in European cities (Brueckner et al., 1999). 
10
 R. F. Muth (1969) had already noticed such a phenomenon. It can be due to the dissociation between 
the density gradient and the rent gradient. While rent increases continuously, the rise in densities is 
affected by the durability of buildings: in European cities, some parts of the central city are protected of 
destruction because of their historical and aesthetic value. As a consequence, densities cannot adapt to the 
rise of the rent. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 76-95 
 84 
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,2 1,7 2,2 2,7 3,2
Household size
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f c
a
rs
 
pe
r 
pe
rs
o
n
 
Figure 3: The “Location effect” of household size on umber of cars per person (the size of the circles is 
proportional to human density). 
Source: HTS 1998, treated by the author. 
 
3.5. Indirect causal links between sociodemographic characteristics and urban form 
 
The direct relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and urban form will 
be illustrated with the concept of self-selection, which “questions the direction of the 
causal relationship between urban form and travel” (Krizek, 2003: 268). The usual link 
between urban form and mobility is reversed: travel patterns determine location in a 
specific urban form. Choosing a specific environment to live would be partly due to 
individuals’ preferences on travel patterns: those who prefer walking, for example, may 
settle in dense, mixed-use locations because more destinations are available at walking 
distance11.  
Thus, a wide selection of travel modes is an important criterion in the selection of the 
residential location: as suburban settlements are supposed “car-dependent” (Newman 
and Kenworthy, 1998), having a modal choice implies to live in dense, well-desserved 
areas. 
If the location in a specific urban form depends on individuals’ preferences on travel 
patterns, then residential location is the result of a choice. But it can also be a constraint, 
due to economic and/or demographic characteristics: G. Dupuy (1999, 2002) has been 
underlying a tendency for populations who can’t afford an automobile (like students or 
unemployed people) to concentrate in the denser parts of the metropolitan area, where a 
modal choice is possible, to reach usual, dispersed destinations12. A central location is 
constrained by the necessity to avoid automobile dependence. 
Thus individuals’characteristics have an effect on travel behaviours, which in turn 
influence the location in a specific urban form. We illustrate such a “gregarious effect” 
in the case of Bordeaux. Populations who have a limited access to automobile are 
mainly unemployed people, students and retired people. The Figure 4 shows that the 
proportion of these populations is positively associated with the number of cars per 
                                                 
11
 This is consistent with the hypothesis of a «consumer city» where speed is one out of four «vital 
amenities» (Glaeser et al., 2000). 
12
 What is called the «gregarious effect» (Dupuy, 2002). Then we find usual results of the N.U.E, where a 
central location is wanted so as to minimize transport costs (and is counterbalanced by higher rents). Yet 
the justification is not the same, as for the N.U.E jobs are concentrated in the CBD. Here, jobs can be 
relatively dispersed in the metroplitan area, and what makes the center attractive is the fact that it is a 
transport node. 
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person, and negatively associated with human density. Furthermore, it exists an obvious 
negative relationship between human density and number of cars per person. Anew, 
we’re faced with a “systematic interaction” between mobility variables, and 
sociodemographic and urban form variables: it seems impossible to reveal causal 
relationships. 
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Figure 4: The «gregarious effect» (the size of the circles is proportional to human density). 
Source: HTS 1998, treated by the author. 
 
3.6. The “triangular interaction” 
 
We have brought to the fore two possible causal relationships between individuals’ 
characteristics and urban form: a direct one, and an indirect one. Our belief is that the 
Gary and Pivo’s conceptual framework of analysis of the determinants of mobility (cf. 
Figure 1), which separates urban form factors from non urban form factors, could be 
completed. 
In order to determine the part of urban form in the whole set of factors of daily 
mobility, we propose to adopt an alternative conceptual framework, which is called the 
“triangular relationship” (cf. Figure 5). It takes in account the possibility of a systematic 
interaction between sociodemographic characteristics and urban form. The use of 
double arrows reflects our incertainty as regards the direction of causality. Thus the 
three types of variables are linked by complex interactions. The “triangular relationship” 
is a kind of circuit for which, by definition, there is no causal theory (Mouchot, 2003: 
172). 
The adoption of the “triangular relationship” as a theoretical framework makes the 
analysis more complex, as if it is imposed by intellectual honesty. Thus, an empirical 
study only allows us to reveal interactions, not causal links. The solution to this problem 
is given by the “statistical control”: the objective is to control for one type of factor of 
the “triangular relationship”, so as to be able to isolate the effect of one type of factor on 
travel patterns. According to R. Cervero and K. Kockelman (1997: 201), “since 
complete statistical control is never fully introduced, any relationships that are 
uncovered are necesarily associative rather than causal.” In order to realize this 
statistical control, we built a specific statistical method which is presented in the 
following section. An application of this method to the metropolitan area of Bordeaux 
allows us to submit some results as far as the urban form-travel patterns interaction is 
concerned. 
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Figure 5: The “triangular relationship”. 
 
4. The urban form – travel patterns interaction: empirical results from an 
application to the metropolitan area of Bordeaux, France 
 
4.1. Methodological insights: the “typological regressions” technique 
 
Sampling. The first step of the “typological regression” technique is to sample the 
statistical population in homogeneous groups. The criterion we chose to make these 
group homogeneous is residential density. As density is recognized to have a strong 
influence on travel behaviours, our aim is to understand “what goes along with density”. 
The population of geographical areas was divided in three groups, labelled low density, 
medium density, and high density13 (see map). 
Constrained regressions. We adapted a standard econometrical method to our 
subject: the constrained regressions technique. The same variables are used to build a 
constrained model (CM, where the coefficients are the same whatever the group) and a 
non-constrained model (NM, where the coefficients are different for each group): 
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Where yi is the explained variable, αh,k a coefficient vector indiced in h, the density 
category, zi,h,k the matrix of the k explicative variables. The εi are the error terms, with 
the usual properties. Linear restrictions are imposed on the explicative variables indiced 
in l. 
                                                 
13
 As the number of observations was very low, we made an exogenous partition: each group has roughly 
the same number of observations, so as their size is sufficient to produce significant results. 
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Figure 6:Carte. Sampling of the 66 zones of the metropolitan area of Bordeaux in 3 groups according to 
the criterion of residential density (density raises as colour is darker). 
 
We test the significativity of the constraints: 
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either for every k, nor for some values of k. 
We build a F-statistic which follows a Fischer-Snédécor law. This test is about the 
same as the structural stability ones (the so-called “Chow” tests). The difference is that 
we seek to analyze spatial stability instead of temporal one. F is defined as follow: 
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where εi,MC are the constrained model errors, εi,MNC are the non-constrained model 
errors (with usual properties), a is the number of linear constraints, et b the number of 
degrees of freedom of the model. 
According to the value of F, we will reject or not the hypothesis of a differentiated 
effect of the explicative variable on the explained variable, according to the group of 
density. As different models are in competition according to the number of linear 
constraints, the choice of the final model is based upon the quality of the adjustement, 
that is the level of the adjusted-R2 and the Akaike criterion. 
 
4.2. An empirical study of the metropolitan area of Bordeaux 
 
In the urban form – travel pattern literature, four mobility variables are usually 
explained: number of travels per day per person; trip length (in km); modal share; and 
VKT (Vehicle-kilometers travelled) per capita, which we consider here as a proxy for 
the gasoline consumption per capita. As the latter variable is the outcome of the other 
ones, some comments will explain VKT per capita by the number of travels and the trip 
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length. We excluded the modal shares, because their analysis need the formulation of a 
discrete choice model (de Palma and Thisse, 1987), for which the typological 
regressions technique is unsuited. We added the number of cars per person. We 
distinguished between home-work trips and non home-work trips, as they’re supposed 
to stand out from distinct travel behaviours. 
To avoid multicollinearity between explicative variables, we built separate models14. 
The “urban form model” includes residential density, the standard error of the 
residential density, and two land-use mix variables: the jobs-housing balance, and a 
sectoral mix khi-square index15. The “size model” includes total population, average 
size of the firms, liveable surface per person, household size. The “income model” 
comprises medium income, age, and proportion of college graduates in the population. 
The last one is the “type of population” model (unemployment rate, proportion of 
retired people, people under 18, students, and women in the population). The results of 
the regressions are presented in the Table at the end of the paper. 
 
The “Urban Form” Model 
 
As far as home-work trips are concerned, the usual hypothesis of a negative impact of 
residential density on gasoline consumption per capita is corroborated in the low- and 
medium-density zones. In low-density zones, it can be explained by a lower number of 
trips per person, and by shorter trip lengths (cf. Table). In the medium-density zones, 
this impact is explained by a modal share in favour of “soft” modes. In the high-density 
zones, residential density has no significant influence on the individual gasoline 
consumption, nor the trip length, nor the number of trips: in the central parts of the city, 
density has no influence on travel patterns. 
The influence of density is more often significant for home-work trips than for non 
home-work trips. Indeed, home-work trips are more scheduled, and a modal shift can be 
made easier; commercial and leisure trips usually represent more complex travel 
patterns, like multi-purpose ones, for which the flexibility of the automobile is more 
adapted. 
Whatever the motive of the trip is, the influence of the distribution of residential 
density on gasoline consumption is only significant for low-density zones. Surprisingly, 
the sign of the coefficient is inversed according to the motive of the trip. The 
interpretation may be as follow: 
 
For home-work trips, the more the distribution of residential density is homogenous, the lower 
individual gasoline consumption is. An homogenous distribution of residential density may 
make the co-location of homes and workplaces easier; 
For non home-work trips, the more the distribution of residential density is heterogenous, the 
lower individual gasoline consumption is. This result is in line with usual arguments about the 
drawbacks of a diffuse pattern of housing – or the advantages of the “polycentric network 
city” (Camagni and Gibelli, 1997). Such a model indicates that relevant planning places exist 
for transit, by standing bus lines against the peripheral concentrations of housing, following 
the principles of Transit-Oriented Development (Laliberté, 2002). 
 
                                                 
14
 The different models were built on two criterions: the 5% significativity of the Pearson coefficients, 
and a Tolerance superior to 0.3. 
15
 Built upon the 36 sectors division made by the INSEE (National Institute of Statistic and Economic 
Studies). 
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As far as the land use mix is concerned, we’ll notice two main results. First, the jobs-
housing balance has a positive influence on gasoline consumption per capita (which is 
contrary to Camagni et al. (2002)’s results). A high jobs-housing balance in a given 
zone may raise individual number of trips, as there are more opportunities around home 
(see the sign of the coefficient); as a consequence, a high jobs-housing balance may 
influence the gasoline consumption via the number of trips per person, and not via trip 
length, as some authors have suggested (Cervero and Wu, 1998; OCDE, 1994)16. 
Furthermore, the more residential a zone is, the higher car owning is. This result is in 
line with usual comments about residential use, which prompts people to use a car, as 
destinations (jobs) are further away. The coefficient is the same whatever the group of 
density is, which means that the effect of residential specialization on the number of 
cars is not differentiated along with the category of density, when number of studies on 
car-dependent land use patterns usually point out a high automobile dependence in 
peripheral, low density zones, where detached housing is predominant. 
Second, the positive influence of sectoral specialization on gasoline consumption per 
capita (for home-work trips only) is in line with the hypothesis of a link between land 
use mix and travel patterns (cf. supra): the more economically specialized a zone is, the 
higher individual trip length by car is. This effect is undifferentiated according to the 
group of density, which means that we can’t rely this result to an economic 
specialization of the peripheral zones17. Some elements on the differenciated impact of 
the type of specialization on travel patterns can be found in G. Pouyanne (2006). 
 
The “size model” 
 
As far as firm size is concerned, there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
gasoline consumption per capita in low-density zones. It can be explained by greater trip 
lengths. Here, the analysis of travel patterns is in line with the fact that the larger firms 
have a strong tendency to suburbanize first, because they have greater needs in space, 
which is more affordable in peripheral zones (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982)18. 
In the overall model, household size has a positive influence on gasoline 
concumption. But as soon as we sample according to density, such an influence 
becomes unsignificant. This result corroborates strongly the above hypothesis of an 
interaction between density and household size, for reasons linked to the size of the 
homes and their spatial repartition. Density and household size covary, and traditional 
methods can’t distinguish which has the strongest influence on travel patterns. Here, our 
method of typological regressions seems to reach its goal: the statistical control of 
density allows to establish that household size doesn’t have an influence by itself on 
travel patterns – its influence “goes along with density”. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to linken jobs-housing balance to the degree of land-use mix, as this variable 
is used most of the time to detect peripheral job centers (Cervero, 1989). 
17
 Furthermore, in the case of the metropolitan area of Bordeaux, F. Gaschet (2001) has showed that 
economic specialization is valid for peripheral zones as well as for central ones. 
18
 If there is a transport infrastructure to provide a good accessibility to these firms, and that these firms 
don’t need complex interactions (as face-à-face ones), like back-office or industrial activities. Otherwise, 
they may stay in the CBD (Ota & Fujita, 1993). 
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The “income model” 
 
Income has a negative influence on gasoline consumption per capita for non home-
work trips, which can be interpretated by the potential, for richer people, to settle near 
natural amenities. Furthermore, income has a negative influence on trip length, which 
corroborates the co-location hypothesis: richer people, thanks to their stronger bidding 
power, have the potentiel to locate near their workplace (Gordon et al., 1991; Krizek, 
2003).  
The influence of median age is negative on trip length as well as on number of travels 
per capita. It may have two possible explanations. First, a “location effect”: as age 
increases, people may have a tendency to use less their automobile, and to locate nearer 
from places they go to. Second, an “urbanization effect”: home-owners, as age 
increases, are more and more in a central location, because the city expands. 
The hypothesis of a specific structure of preference is tested thanks to the proportion 
of College graduates in the population. We note that its negative influence on VKT per 
capita (home-work trips), trip length and number of cars per person is not significative 
after having controlled for density. It means there is a mediation of urban form on this 
influence: college graduates have a tendency to concentrate in denser parts of the city, 
but don’t have a specific mobility behaviour. 
 
The “type of population model” 
 
Thanks to the “type of population” model, we try to test the validity of the “gregarious 
effect” hypothesis, which supposes that people who don’t have access to an automobile 
(such as retired people, students, poorest people…) may locate in the denser parts of the 
city, because it’s easier to use an alternative travel mode, such as transit or walking (see 
above). Our results confirm a weaker access of such populations to the car, as the 
coefficients for number of cars per person are all negative. But we cannot confirm a 
gregarious effect in terms of trip length, number of travels (except for retired people), or 
gasoline consumption. That is, if the type of population has an effect on car possession, 
it doesn’t have an effect on car use. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The debate on the model of Compact City, following the very controversial P. 
Newman and J. Kenworthy (1989)’s book, Cities and Automobile Dependence, has 
quickly ended up at a very general controversy about the advantages and the drawbacks 
of urban densities. This long-time questioning seems to be condemned to slip towards a 
confrontation of value judgement, as we don’t (and we will probably never) know if 
cities must be built vertically or not (Breheny, 1997). As such, the debate is in the 
deadlock. 
However, a problem without solution may be a badly formulated problem: the debate 
has turned to an investigation of the interaction between land use and travel patterns. 
The copious literature on this subject has allowed to make some progress, on the ground 
of the method as well as on the ground of empirical results. Numerous urbanistic 
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realizations or urban plans, aiming at reducing automobile use, were based on the 
progress made by this kind of literature. 
This paper is based on the idea of a systematic interaction between the factors on 
daily mobility: There are complex interactions between the individual 
(sociodemographic characteristics), its environment (urban form characteristics), and its 
behaviour (the travel patterns). This framework presses to the use of a specific 
quantitative method. As was noted in other contributions (Cervero and Kockelman, 
1997; Handy, 2002), progress can’t be made without “statistical control”. We built an 
econometric method, the “typological regressions”, which allows to control for a factor 
by sampling the population according to a specific factor. Here, the objective is to 
control for density, so as to understand the influences that “goes along with density”. 
Three important results can be taken from this empirical investigation on the 
metropolitan area of Bordeaux. First, the influence of urban form. The influence of 
density on travel patterns is corroborated, which confirms the traditional advantage of 
the “Compact City” model. What’s more, the influence of the distribution of densities in 
a given zone shows the relevance of the Polycentric Network City. Thus, urban policies 
may tend to raise densities and to follow the principales of the Transit Oriented 
Development. Second, our results corroborate some important hypotheses in the 
literature, such as the “gregarious effect”, and the “co-location hypothesis”. However, 
the hypothesis of the impact of land use mix on travel behaviour needs further 
investigation. Third, on a methodological ground, the analysis of household size shows 
that the method of “typological regressions” is particularly well fitted to disentangle 
urban form and sociodemographic factors of daily travel. As such, we hope that such 
methodological and technical considerations will be more taken in account in the 
literature, as, for example, Lin and Yang (2009) has recently tried to do.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Results of the typological regressions for the metropolitan area of Bordeaux. 
 
Note: the t-ratios are in italics; significant coefficients (at a 5% level) are in bold type. 
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Table 2: Results of the typological regressions for the metropolitan area of Bordeaux (to be continued). 
 
Note: the t-ratios are in italics; significant coefficients (at a 5% level) are in bold type. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
